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Abstract  
The focus of this thesis is on the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC
1
) currently 
used in complex conflicts and post-conflict situations. It examines how this 
method may have an adverse effect on the hitherto cooperative relationship 
between the Norwegian state and Norwegian humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations (NGO)
2
. Their close relationship is often referred to as the 
“Norwegian Model”3 known for constructive humanitarian assistance based on 
consensus between the state and the NGOs in which the NGOs played an 
important and autonomous role. NGOs have for the most part kept a sceptical 
position towards civil-military cooperation methods, since they are dependent on 
being perceived as a neutral actor in the field. They are concerned that it may 
seriously affect the neutrality of humanitarian aid. With the CIMIC approach the 
political focus stands to shift dramatically and Norwegian NGOs are facing a 
situation where they have to cooperate and coordinate with a third party, namely 
the Norwegian military.  
This thesis attempts to examine the different perspectives held by the state, 
NGOs and the military regarding this new approach and to ask whether 
Norwegian NGOs are indeed affected by this new tripartite approach to aid. 
 
 
                                              
1 The definition of this term will follow in chapter 1.3 
2  The correct abbreviation would be HNGO, but I will use NGO as this more common. 
3 The “Norwegian Model” is here referred to Terje Tved‟s (2003:57-58) definition as a organizational form to 
arrange the relationship between the state, organization and the research done on north-south development but it is 
also the ground model  for the Norway‟s peace making model were this relationship is used as a base for defining 
NGOs role in foreign political peace work.  
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1. Introduction 
”Current civil-military coordination concepts paint a picture in which everyone on the “team” 
just needs to “pull in the same direction”. However, (…) it turns out that some on the team don‟t 
remember joining, don‟t want to be on the boat and refuse to row. Others, who didn‟t join the 
team, will cooperate if the boat is moving in one direction, but not if it turns in another. Some 
don‟t like the unruly nature of the team, and keep asking “who is the captain?” Some are 
paddling with their hands, while others have huge, mechanized oars. Some complain about that 
others are not pulling their weight and are slowing the whole boat down. Some want to get 
downriver, but don‟t want to be seen on the boat with the others. Some feel that everyone would 
get downriver faster if they split up into separate boats (Olsen & Gregorian 2007:12) 
 
This metaphor, for the civil-military cooperation concept, illustrates how many 
perceive today‟s conditions for the humanitarian and military actors that are 
deployed to complex conflicts. It appears to be an „agreed' approach, that 
everybody just needs to pull in the same direction. This is especially the political 
vision of what needs to be done in the current situation in Afghanistan. However, 
as the metaphor shows things are not moving along easily.  The situation in 
Afghanistan are bringing the military into the humanitarian sphere, and this is 
leading to challenges for the Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that 
traditionally has lead the humanitarian efforts (Shannon 2009). 
This thesis is studying this development from the Norwegian perspective. 
Traditionally, the Norwegian military have worked within in the boundaries of 
defence and security while the Norwegian civilian effort has been directed 
towards relief and development. Norway‟s current position in Afghanistan stands 
to alter this traditional division of labour.  In Afghanistan, Norway is contributing 
with a significant military effort by leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) in Meymaneh and a unit of Special Forces in the Kabul area,
4
 showing a 
military side that has not been connected to Norway‟s foreign policies earlier. For 
that reason, this position may possible have a negative affect on the well-
                                              
4 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/campaign/nato07main/nato/afghanistan.html?id=460974 
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established relationship between the Norwegian government and Norwegian 
NGOs due to Norway‟s small state profile they have been able to maintain a close 
relationship without it affecting the perception of Norwegian NGOs. 
This thesis contributes to the debate by using the Norwegian model to 
demonstrate the unique relationship Norwegian NGOs have with the Norwegian 
government, it will discuss what civil-military cooperation is and if it may affect 
the  relationship between the Norwegian government and NGOs. It will examine 
how civil-military cooperation is understood by the different actors and try to 
explain what underpins their differences in perspectives.  The current situation in 
Afghanistan is used as a case study since it has developed into „Norway‟s largest 
and most important foreign operation‟ (Støre 2009 [speech]5).  
1.1 Background 
The ending of the Cold War set the beginning of military intervention based on 
other considerations than upholding the bipolar standstill between the United 
States (US) and the Soviet Union (Collier 2007). It also marks the time where one 
started to notice a growth in the size and range of NGOs (Goodhand 2006).  The 
altered state of the political environment after the Cold War had an effect on how 
security was perceived. From focusing on inter- state conflicts as the main source 
of regional and international turmoil this shifted to focusing on intra-states 
conflicts as the main source for instability (Jackson & Sørensen 2003). 
Today, ethnical conflicts, failing states, terrorism, civil wars and their potential 
extended effects, has been added to the list of  new areas of concern for the 
international society. Norway, which has linked its security measurements to a 
power structure where the European Union (EU) NATO, US and Russia are the 
                                              
5 Jonas Ghar Støre, speech at Chautau neuf May 14th 2009.  
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main players, is also being affected by these changes in the international security 
debate. The last couple of years the power balance between these players has 
shifted and Russia has become a weaker player in comparison to the others. 
Further changes have been that NATO‟s role is shifting and the organisation is 
expanding its security focus to areas outside of Europe simultaneously the EU is 
growing and gaining more members from the eastern parts of Europe (Styrke & 
relevans 2004:19 article 25). These internationally changes has lead Norway to 
expanded its definition of state security (Evne til innsats 2009:20 article 17-22). 
Now also social and human security are inherent parts of state security, and it is 
argued that the best way to achieve human and social security is through civil-
military cooperation (ibid: 48 article 89).  
The change in Norway‟s definition of state security is linked to the international 
transition between two guiding norm sets, „the human rights and  humanitarian 
law norm set‟ and „the sovereignty and non-intervention norm set‟ (Weil: 2001, 
Jackson and Sørensen 2003). The political shift between these two norm sets is 
leading the focus towards more civil-military cooperation in complex conflicts.  
The rights aspect of the new norm set is leading to a trend where humanitarian 
action is being tied up to donor countries political response to complex conflicts.  
The situation in Afghanistan is where this is playing out for Norway‟s part. In 
Norway‟s engagement with Afghanistan the focus on approaches that are either 
„comprehensive, integrated or holistic‟ seems to be gaining way. 
These approaches often advocates for development methods where security, 
political and humanitarian dimensions can function in an interlinked or integrated 
way. Norway‟s strategic concept report “Evne til innsats” (2009) states that 
through a comprehensive approach one will achieve „more sustainability in 
military missions‟  and that more interaction between the military, political and 
humanitarian effort is decisive in achieving this (Evne til innsats 2009: 70 article, 
152). 
4 
 
The focus on coherence brought about by the Norwegian government is difficult 
for the humanitarian and military agents because of little common understanding 
of what cooperation will mean for each actor. The traditional separation of 
humanitarian and military effort has beside the conventional division of labour, 
also historical aspect. The Norwegian aid society has more or less established 
itself outside the foreign political sphere. Even though the role NGOs have today 
is viewed as a vital part of the Norwegian foreign policy, NGOs where not 
viewed as important in this sphere before the mid-nineties (Lie 2006). 
In today‟s complex conflicts NGOs play a central role as providers of 
humanitarian assistance and as development partners. Their neutral profile 
provides them with access to areas and to people that are viewed as having 
consequential importance for maintaining stability (Waldman 2008). This role 
has over time become central in peace and stability operation as the connection 
between relief, development and conflicts has become more evident in foreign 
policy.  
According to Terje Tvedt a professor in political science, the use of Norwegian 
NGOs in foreign policy is first of all due to the existence of the extensive 
cooperation that had developed between the state and NGOs as part of the 
Scandinavian welfare model and secondly, because many organisations were 
already abroad working for governmental funding (Øvrebø 1995) . The 
continuum of further integration has been kept alive through economic and 
normative integration, made possible by the massive amount of funding that gets 
channeled from the state to the NGOs each year (Tvedt 2003)  
The use of the Norwegian model in the international arena has worked because of 
the autonomic role the NGOs have played. Even as actors in Norwegian foreign 
policy Norwegian NGOs have still managed to work on issues that they have 
found most pressing (Smillie 1994). This new focus on cooperation with other 
5 
 
actors can affect this relationship so it raises concerns about what impact it may 
have on humanitarian aid and the principles it is built on. The other concern is 
security, with more cooperation some fear that humanitarian aid will be 
understood as a political or military instrument a perception that may have a 
direct influence on the security level for the humanitarian personnel (NUPI report 
2000).  
The question on how to best preserve the humanitarian space has become a hot 
topic within the humanitarian body. Many NGOs that work with humanitarian 
assistance stress that, in these new conflicts, the multi-dimensional sets of actors  
is very challenging and they require both cooperation and clearly defined roles 
(SCHR 2010). The issue of roles and clear lines between the work done by 
humanitarian actors and military actors got a lot of media attention after the 
former state Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Bård Glad Pedersen (Eide 
2004)
6
 stated that in some situations he justified the use of military actors as 
humanitarian agents; „when they (soldiers) where operating in areas where there 
was little or no NGOs, since they (the soldiers) had a responsibility towards the 
local population‟ (ibid.). The response from Norwegian NGOs came 
immediately; they argued that this form of blurring led to NGOs becoming 
perceived as political motivated actors making them extremely vulnerable for 
attacks. 
Through my research on the perceptions held by the various agents I have 
discovered that, while there is a recognition of the need for cooperation there is a 
sense of unwillingness as well as a view that it is to difficult to meaningfully 
integrate the different dimension into one coherent strategy. Even though there‟s 
seems to be an understanding of the importance of clearly defined roles from all 
parties.  
6 
 
1.2 Hypothesis 
On the basis of this I have made the hypothesis that; The NGOs and the 
Norwegian government are at odds, because they have different perceptions of 
how civilian-military operations will impact Norwegian humanitarian assistance.  
In order to test my hypothesis several sub-questions must be asked:  
1. What are the main differences, between the Norwegian government 
and the Norwegian NGOs regarding their views about co-ordinated 
efforts?  
2. How do Norwegian NGOs see this shift in operations affecting them 
and their work and how might this affect the overall aims of 
Norwegian humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan?  
Will it, for example, limit the kind of projects that only “fit” into the 
NATO concept of security? 
3. How will the civil-military approach affect the capacity of NGOs to 
maintain their neutrality in the field, and hence their security? 
4. Who, in the end, evaluates these consequences for humanitarian 
assistance: the Norwegian military, the Norwegian state, the 
Norwegian aid agencies or NATO? 
 
These questions will be addressed by studying and analysing white papers on 
Norway‟s security, development and relief politics. To se how these government 
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
6 http://www.mil.no/start/article.jhtml?articleID=87419 
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documents are presenting this current shift.  To gain some more insight in the 
situation for NGOs there have been done two interviews, one with an 
representative from the Norwegian Red Cross and one interview with a 
representative from Medicines sans frontiers (MSF), Mons Sydness and Tony 
Mechant. Both giving insight in how their organisations are handling these 
changes. Their interviews have for the most part been used to support my 
findings from the written material that has been used.  
The large debate about civil-military cooperation in post conflict operations 
(Ankersen 2008, Rana 2008, Braem 2008, De Coning 2008)and the theoretical 
and moral discussions around this form of cooperation(Slim 1997, 2007, Fox 
2001, Frangonikolopoulos  2005,Shannon 2009 ) have  been used to give a 
framework to discuss the how this new form of cooperating may affect 
humanitarian assistance.  
1.3 Definitions of actors, terms and demarcations 
1.3.1 Actors 
There are a number of actors involved in rebuilding failed states and in complex 
conflict situations, but in this thesis the focus will be on these three actors: the 
humanitarian actor, the military actor and the political actor.  
 
Humanitarian actors:  
“Civilians, (…) which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are 
engaged in humanitarian activities”.7 In the development field they are also 
                                              
7 From Civil military guidelines at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/ASIN-7CHT7T?OpenDocument  
page 8. 02.09.09 
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referred to as: voluntary organisations, private development organisations, 
people's organisations, private voluntary organisations, and the third sector, to 
name a few. One term that seems to be the most common is the non governmental 
organisation (NGO) and this is the term that will be used in this thesis. One thing 
they all seem to have in common is that they see themselves as the opposite of 
governments. This plays an important role in freeing NGOs from established 
political hierarchies, though this assumption at the same time ignores the extent 
to which many of their projects are inter-dependent with governments' own 
activities (Brown 1990:4 cited in Smillie 1994:157
8
). 
 
Military actors: 
Since this thesis is using the situation in Afghanistan as a case study, military 
actors will include both the Norwegian national military and multinational 
military such as NATO
9
.  
 
Political actors: 
Political actors are to be understood as the Norwegian government and 
Norwegian political departments that are responsible for the Norwegian political 
position regarding civil-military co-operation in Afghanistan, however it needs to 
be acknowledged that the development of such a political position is not made in 
a vacuum. It is a result of agreements with international political organisations 
and norms made by the United Nation (UN), European Union (EU) as well as 
other states and organisations, and can not be seen as a strictly “national” policy. 
 
                                              
8 Article received at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/c774047641439g4u/  04.09.09 
9 Norwegian military actors deployed in multinational military forces are still regarded as Norwegian forces, since the 
main change of command is reserved Norway. Meaning that all activities Norwegian soldiers are a part of under their 
deployment is approved in advance by the Norwegian political actor/government or political department. 
9 
 
1.3.2 Definition of terms and demarcations of policies 
A predicament when studying this development is finding clear definitions of the 
different terms.  Even though this thesis will not include a study on these debates, 
a few of the terms need to be defined. The terms „war‟ and „armed conflict‟ 
seems to be fairly clear, but when it comes to civil-military cooperation there are 
different perceptions and different use of the term by the different actors 
depending on the wide range of activities that they perceive it to cover. The 
Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan is due to Norway‟s NATO 
membership and since Norway has not developed a separate definition on civil-
military cooperation
10
  NATO‟s doctrine will be used to define civil-military 
cooperation. The military acronym used by NATO of this form of cooperation is 
CIMIC. CIMIC is: 
 
"The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, 
including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organizations and agencies. (NATO 2003, AJP-9 102-1) 
 
 
CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation between the military officers and 
civilian agents. The purpose of CIMIC is to support „the military mission‟.  
Within NATO there is a growing view that CIMIC is the leading approach to 
gain more integration between the military and the civilian effort (FFOD 
2007:141
11
). CIMIC is as such an approach that is aimed at reducing the tendency 
of overlaps of projects between the NATO commander, civilian organisations 
like NGOs and local authorities by providing means of better coordination and 
co-operations. There is no call to conduct humanitarian projects within the 
doctrine, nor is there an exclusion of such projects, provided that they support 
                                              
10 Other countries like Finland have made their own national CIMIC definition and approach. Norway has not done 
this and all the white papers and reports form the Norwegian government so far have more or less supported the 
definition and approach formulated in NATOs doctrine. 
11 The Norwegian armed forces joint operational doctrine(FFOD) 
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„the military mission”. According to Rana (2008) this has led towards a 
convergence of NATO‟s CIMIC and the United States Armed Forces (USAF) 
Civil Affairs (CA) approach. The United States (US) approach focuses on 
influencing the environment to support their armed forces through „hearts and 
minds strategies‟. “The two approaches are broadly moving towards 
convergence, or at least share sufficient common ground to be compatible” 
(ibid.2008:230).  
Even though this thesis is using the definition presented by the NATO doctrine, 
other international organisations have formulated their own definitions of what 
civil-military coordination is, where the military imperative “supporting the 
mission” is not the leading theme. One example is the definition provided by 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), of the UN that defines civil-military 
co-ordination as; 
 “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies 
that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and 
when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a 
shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training” (IASC: 2009:8). 
 
Here the focus is on the humanitarian principles as the frame in which any 
interaction should be made. It also argues that coordination only should be used 
when there are common goals. These goals should be based on the humanitarian 
imperative which is to give neutral assistance within a „humanitarian space‟. The 
reason for coordination in the NATO doctrine is to reach the mission goal as 
stated in NATO (2003) AJP-9 article 102-2c: 
 “In co-operating with a potentially wide range of civilian bodies, NATO's forces will, as far as possible 
and within military means and capabilities, accommodate and support the activities of these bodies, providing this 
does not compromise the mission”(1-2). 
 
The initial comparison indicate that there are two fundamental different 
demonstrations of what „the mission‟ entails, placing conflicting value aspects on 
11 
 
civil-military cooperation activities. It creates more confusion than structure in 
the discussion on civil-military cooperation and how it may affect the 
humanitarian space. This is not to say that the civilian body doesn‟t believe there 
could be a need for civil-military co-operation, as the IASC (2009) report states, 
in some cases the humanitarian objective of providing assistance to people in 
need may give way for a „pragmatic‟ approach that might include co-operation 
with military actors, but the humanitarian body is focused on that it must not 
compromise the humanitarian imperative (IASC 2009:10).   
The humanitarian imperative is best discussed using the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC) definitions of the principles. The three main 
humanitarian principles are: impartiality, neutrality and independence. It is 
difficult to separate these three principles because they have no clear boundaries 
between them and they are built on the same value, humanity, which holds that all 
human suffering must be addressed with particular attention to the most 
vulnerable. These principles are important and most NGOs rely on them to 
provide an image that they are without a political agenda and are to be viewed as 
neutral actors in a war zone. This is a way to gain protection and access. NGOs 
are not a homogenous group and therefore there are some different definitions on 
these principles, but they are for the most part built on the ICRC principles. 
The ICRC defines these principles as follows: 
Impartiality  
“It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It 
endeavors only to relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress”.12 
 
                                              
12 Cited from the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/EA08067453343B76C1256D2600383BC4?OpenDocument&Style=
Custo_Final.3&View=defaultBody4  date:04.09.2009 
12 
 
Impartiality shows that humanitarian assistance must not discriminate against 
anyone due to of the elements mentioned above, nor might there be any 
subjective distinction for whom that receive aid. It also states that one must focus 
the assistance after the degree of need; the once that are in most need should be 
the first to receive assistance.  
 
Neutrality  
 
 “In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or 
engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. 13.  
 
By not taking side in hostilities, the organisations are also rejecting the idea of 
working within the frames of a military operation. They can therefore work in 
areas that are under military control, without supporting one side over the other. 
By staying neutral NGOs can go into areas and give assistance to who ever needs 
it. This principle also states that to achieve neutrality one must also avoid having 
political or other ideological affiliation that might hinder them in their work 
(Rehse 2004). The neutrality is the principle that has received most critique over 
the years so today; many NGOs are partly leaving it behind. As explained in the 
introduction, the new norm set that values humanitarian law and civilian 
protection is gaining more and more support in the international society and it is 
affecting the humanitarian debate. Some NGOs are saying that neutrality is 
undesirable or even unachievable (Slim 1997). For Norwegian NGOs the 
Norwegian model can also make it difficult to be viewed as neutral. Deliberate 
integration of NGOs as development partners could contribute to the perception 
that they are not as neutral as they see themselves.  Being perceived as affiliated 
with military forces on the ground may have security impacts. Being perceived as 
                                              
13 Cf.: footnote No. 12 
13 
 
acting on the behalf of the Norwegian government can be viewed as political 
affiliation and can in the long run become an obstacle their work.  
 
Independence: 
 
 “The Red Cross is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of 
their Governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that 
they may be able at all times to act in accordance with Red Cross principles. 14.  
 
Being independent is vital for the NGOs. For the Norwegian organisations the 
biggest issue concerning independence is leniently connected to the funding of 
NGOs by the state. Even though there is not a 1-1 relation between economy and 
independence it can become problematic that the same donor is pushing for civil 
military cooperation. Funding may be conditioned on what is perceived by the 
Norwegian state and military as most important and most supportive of the 
mission. 
 
Many humanitarian NGOs believe that through the politicisation and 
militarisation of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, these ICRC objectives 
are being transgressed. They fear that the humanitarian imperative based on these 
three principles will be undermined since the co-operation perspective held by 
that state and by NATO seems to be the appropriate political response for the 
challenges they meet in these new types of complex conflicts (Wolf-Dieter 2008 
[speech]
15
). 
 
Humanitarian space 
 
                                              
14 Cf.: footnote No.12 
15Available at ; www.challengesforum.org/.../Wolf_Dieter_Eberwein_Challenges_Forum_2008.pdf 01.02.2010 
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The humanitarian space is one of the core issues when it comes to the concerns 
about „blurring roles‟. From the interviews and research done in this thesis the 
need for humanitarian space has been referred to as a “core component” for 
NGOs. The UN‟s IASC uses this definition: 
 
 “A key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy, consists of establishing 
and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (this is sometimes referred to as”humanitarian 
space"). The perception of adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian 
operations represents the critical means by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met 
wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of 
humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in 
which humanitarian organizations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained 
humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is not 
conditional upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is independent of military and 
political action”( MCDA rapport 2003:).  
 
 
The “humanitarian space”, and the protection of it, also seems to be the key 
touchstone in the debate between the State and aid NGOs in Norway. Although 
there seems to be a common agreement that the humanitarian space must be 
sheltered, there are different views on how it is best done. This is one of the issue 
that gets most attention in the discussion abut the civil- military approach. 
 
Complex Conflicts 
 
The last term that needs to be defined is “complex conflicts16”. One common 
denominator for complex conflicts is the need for external assistance in form of 
civil or/and military effort.  
 
The UN's IASC defines complex conflicts as: 
 
  “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international 
                                              
16 The UN uses the term complex crises, but the term complex conflicts are used in other reports and articles used in 
this thesis so I will use the term conflict. 
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response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country 
program..”(MCDA report 2003:3) 
 
 
Many of the post Cold War conflicts have these characteristics and they require 
the co-operation of military and humanitarian actors to be solved. They are often 
connected to humanitarian crises where the redistribution of emergency aid 
becomes vital and the relationship between the military and the humanitarian 
actors becomes central in achieving sustainable peace and stability (Neuhaus 
2008:202). So in these situations the focus on role, co-operation and coordination 
becomes significant. These conflicts are often based on old conflict-lines like 
ethnic cleavages and power struggles between different groups, which makes it 
difficult to get approval from all parties to allow external military and external 
humanitarian agents to enter into the conflict zone(s). The military will in these 
cases never be perceived as neutral partners, but they have an important role as 
stabilisers so that the humanitarian actors may start rebuilding and helping the 
population (Collier 2007). The fact that military agents will never be perceived as 
neutral agents makes it even more important that it is a clear distinction between 
military and the humanitarian agents. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis. 
This thesis has 8 chapters.  Chapter 1 has presented the hypothesis and the 
background for this thesis. The main actors and definitions have also been 
presented.  A short discussion about the definitions has given a glint into the 
differences between these actors that are now moving closer together. Chapter 2 
and chapter 3 will present the methodological and theoretical framework. There 
will be used different theoretical and methodological angles to give a broad 
discussion about the challenges surrounding the civil-military debate. 
16 
 
 Chapter 4 gives a short presentation of the Norwegian model as it is only used as 
an explanatory model presenting the Norwegian government‟s relationship with 
Norwegian NGOs, as well as the historical backdrop to this unique relationship. 
Chapter 5 present the current post-conflict situation in Afghanistan and the 
civilian and military effort Norway is involved in there.  Chapter 6 discuss what 
civil-military cooperation means and explore the debate around civil-military 
cooperation and chapter 7 follow closely chapter 6, but brings in the moral debate 
around what this political shift will mean for the principles behind humanitarian 
assistance. Chapter 8 sums up the finding done throughout the thesis and 
discusses what effects this may have for humanitarian assistance and give some 
concluding remarks. 
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2.  Theory  
The next two chapters will present the theoretical and methodological analytical 
frames used in this thesis. The following chapter will focus on the theories used, 
while chapter three will focus on the methods used and discuss the analytical 
aspects of choosing them. The purpose of this thesis is to study the perspectives 
of the government, NGOs and the military regarding civil-military cooperation 
and to examine whether Norwegian NGOs are in fact influenced, and what 
consequences it may have for humanitarian assistance. In order to conduct a 
meaningful study that encapsulates the complexity of this issue I choose to use 
several theories and methods. 
2.1 Introduction: Theoretical overview 
Three theories have been chosen to try to provide the grounds for a broad 
discussion to the hypothesis and sub-question made in the pervious chapter. The 
first theory is integration theory.  The works of Lorentzen (1994) will be used; it 
focuses on the integration of Norwegian NGOs into the Norwegian political 
sphere through normative and economical integration. Explaining how 
Norwegian NGOs have developed tight relationship with the Norwegian 
government resulting in what has been labelled the Norwegian model. What 
implication might the integration process have now, when it comes to the 
question of cooperating with military agents? 
The second theory is Hirschman‟s “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” consumer theory 
(1970). Focusing, on how to responses to declining results from firms, 
organisations and states. The focus here will be on how NGOs respond to the 
changing policies from the Norwegian government and the changing context in 
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which they operate.  The third theory is the humanitarian debate. The debate 
questions what should be the leading principle to guide humanitarian action.  
Should one, when faced with today‟s complex conflicts choose to follow the 
three traditional core humanitarian principles, supporting the argument that these 
principles are sufficient (Fox 2001) or should one abandon  one of the core 
principle; neutrality, because it is outdated, as suggested by Slim (1997). In this 
thesis Hirschman‟s three types of response mechanisms  will be linked to the 
humanitarian debate to suggest what Norwegian NGOs may do if the shift in 
politics is compromising their ability to function as independent actors. 
Traditionally the three core principles presented in chapter 1, assets the NGO‟s 
humanitarian position. They are now being challenged. The two main theories are 
„traditional humanitarian‟ and „new humanitarianism‟. The „new 
humanitarianism‟ is quickly becoming a new banner for NGOs that welcomes a 
broader cooperation platform and involvement in the political sphere. Other 
NGOs are concerned about the consequences a broader approach might have for 
them and their ability to remain neutral and maintain their humanitarian space. 
Using these theories will affect the focus of the thesis so that it will mostly look 
at the types of consequences that may occur in the future based on the 
experiences that the actors have had so far. By choosing to focus on certain 
subjects and choosing these theories other subjects will be sidestepped. By using 
three theories there is also unlikely that all the criteria‟s will be fulfilled, but 
hopefully they will be useful to explain the questions that are relevant for this 
thesis. When working with several theories there is a need for a methodical 
approach that allows one to coordinate them, pragmatism is a method that allows 
this so it will be used as a ground stone for the methodological framework. 
By definition the goal of civil-military coordination as a method to make coherent 
approaches trough coordination of different actors that are playing vital roles in 
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conflict areas. However in this case focus is on the interplay between these actors 
and how they perceive to be affected by this new approach for Norwegian 
assistance, the main question is if NGOs is perceived and portrayed as force 
multipliers will they lose their role as neutral agents in the field, what 
consequences will this in the end have for the humanitarian mission on the 
ground? What consequences will it have for the civilian population depending on 
humanitarian aid?   
Today‟s conflicts and the range of their extended effects are the context in which 
these issues need to be addressed. By coordinating the armed and civilian effort 
the goal is to develop approaches that are better equipped to face the challenges 
of today‟s conflicts, but what if one of  the  actors „looses‟ their identify as a 
result of it? In the Norwegian context there are some additional challenges 
because of the way humanitarian assistance has been organised in Norway. My 
assumption is that these changes will cause conflicts in the Norwegian model.  
So to test my assumption; that the Norwegian government and the Norwegian 
NGOs are at odds and what consequences this may have, three theories will be 
used. The integration theory will be used to analyse the relationship between the 
state and NGOs. As an illustration of how the integration process has developed 
the works of Terje Tvedt (2003) The Norwegian model will be used as an 
explanatory model. The focus will be to explicate the process that has led the 
state and NGOs to work so closely together. 
2.2 Integration theory  
Lorentzen (1994:47) argues that “Strong indicators for integration is when  
corporative arrangements develops due to economical funding or normative 
integration” This types of funding are often viewed differently by NGOs and the 
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state. While NGOs perceive funding as a recognition of their work, the state uses 
funding strategically as a way to get their own interests realised (Groth 1999:13). 
So disagreements between the government and NGOs are usually connected to 
underlining principles. In this case civil-military cooperation and the way it may 
comprimise the humanitarian principles seems to be one of the main reasons for 
the different views on cooperation.  
The are several ways integration and integration processes develop. There is no 
need for direct interrelationship between them, also informal integration can lead 
to integration. An example of this informal integration is that the process has 
developed over time and is rooted in historical factors (Groth 1999:13). These 
informal integration processes developed  into a formal integration process when 
they started haveing a regulating effect on Norwegian NGOs. Lorentzen 
(1994:55) presents  four main forms of integration; normative, economical, 
professionalism and management. Two of them, normative and economical, will 
be used.  One of the objectives of this thesis is to study the perceptions and 
consequences these from of integration processes have had.   
Perceptions are likely to be influenced by norms both from within the aid system 
and by norms generated by the government due to the role NGO play in 
international relations. The economical contributions have played an important 
part in making the NGOs become a more formal part of the state system (Tvedt 
2003) and further more it has affected their role as an independent party.  
2.2.1 Normative integration: 
Trough normative integration of state norms state standards are being used as 
base for NGOs activities (Lorentzen 1994). This can manifest itself in many 
ways, but mainly through political descriptions or perceptions of their role. The 
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action plan “New roles for NGOs17” from 2006 sectioned by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) evaluated Norwegian NGOs as channels in development 
cooperation is a good example of this.  This plan did not only evaluate 
Norwegian aid and humanitarian assistance, it also predicted some general 
guidelines on what roles these organisations could play in the future.  
The view that these organisations would continue to play an important role is 
stated through the three main options that where indicated, where one could 
either keep (1) status quo, with 40% of all humanitarian aid being channelled 
through multilateral organisations and 50% through NGOs or (2) channel more 
through multilateral organisations or (3) channel even more through NGOs 
depending on what capacities one wanted to focus Norwegian aid on. Multilateral 
organisations like UN being the only legitimate organisation able to enter into 
countries and taking control. On the other hand the NGOs are perceived to be 
more efficient when it comes to responding to humanitarian crises (Nye roller 
plan 2006:233-234).  
Norwegian policies towards the NGOs are dependent on normative political 
interpretations of their role. If measured by the amount of money channelled 
through them it is likely to assume that they regard them as vital actors in the 
system and that normative and economical integration is a large part of the 
model.  
 
2.2.2 Economical integration: 
“Economical integration is the most frequent used indicator of integration 
between state and NGOs” (Lorentzen 1994:56). The economical funding of 
                                              
17 Norwegian title; Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeid (2006), 
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Norwegian NGOs happens in different ways. One way is economical funding to 
developmental plans that are channelled through different funding measurements 
like project or program funding. Another is direct humanitarian funding which is 
channelled directly from the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) under the budget 
post 163.  The political foundation for this type of funding is stated in White 
paper no. 1 for each year and the follow-up of this is done through an informal 
contact between the department and the NGOs (White paper no 1 2001 2002). A 
critic raised toward this form of funding is that the close relationship with the 
political sphere can led to politicised aid (Braem 2008, Eriksen 2010). This may 
leave an impression that the cooperative system has left the NGOs without „free 
will‟ but they have developed some forms of counterstrategies.   
NGOs are not a homogenous group so they will develop their own ways to handle 
the changing environment. Some organisations are more critical towards civil-
military cooperation than others, so while some open up for some military 
assistance to secure their humanitarian space, other feared that too much help 
with this could be perceived as cooperation with armed forces (Harang: 2008). 
The Norwegian Government and military officials states that while they are 
committed to developing more cooperation they would like to preserve the 
humanitarian principles, by better understanding each others role (Støre 
2008[speech]). Other argued that humanitarian assistance and aid is already so 
incorporated into the political sphere that the thought of apolitical aid is 
unrealistic. To examine what options of response the NGOs may have to 
represent their perceptions of CIMIC and what consequences they think it can 
lead to Hirschman‟s consumer theory will be used. 
2.3 Hirschman’s consumer theory 
The basic concept is as follows:     
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 “(...) members of an organisation, whether a business, a nation or any other form of human grouping, 
have essentially two possible responses when they perceive that the organisation is demonstrating a 
decrease in quality or benefit to the member: they can exit (withdraw from the relationship); or they can 
voice (attempt to repair or improve the relationship through communication of the complaint, grievance 
or proposal for change
18)” 
The new humanitarian approach, advocates for more politically active types of 
NGOs. The Norwegian model is built on NGOs being contracted into the political 
sphere through different integration processes, but not being actively involved in 
the international policy making, outside the sphere of development policies (Lie 
2004). Traditional values are still very much connected to Norwegian aid, while 
the new ideas are gaining more room in the international arena trough human 
rights organisations like Amnesty and more voice active NGOs like the MSF. 
One can argue that there is developing a discrepancy between the traditional core 
humanitarian principles advocated by the ICRC and new humanitarianism.  
In the context of this thesis the NGOs can choose to use exit, as a tool to distance 
themselves from becoming political tools for foreign politics, but it will be 
difficult, at least for the smaller NGOs, to exit their relationship to the Norwegian 
government  since they are more or less state funded. This leads to the interplay 
of what Hirschman has named loyalty which can affect the reasoning behind 
using either voice or exit; 
 “(...) the interplay of loyalty can affect the cost-benefit analysis of whether to use exit or voice. 
Whether there is loyalty to the organisation (as evidenced by strong patriotism politically, or brand 
loyalty for consumers), exit may be reduced, especially where options to exit are not so appealing (small 
job marked, political or financial hurdles to emigrate or move)
19
  
When it comes to the interplay of loyalty one must bear in mind that the 
Norwegian aid system has developed in the way that it has, because of an agreed 
                                              
18
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exit, _Voice, _and Loyalty. Received: 11/5-09 
 
19
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exit,_Voice,_and_Loyalty. Received 11/5-09 
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common “goal”. There has been a political agreement about aid policy and what 
humanitarian assistance should include (Groth 1999:13, Tvedt 2003:65-67). The 
economical funding and normative integration that has followed appears to have 
developed a political dependency on the traditional rhetoric of the relationship 
with the state. This view has developed a form of loyalty together with the 
funding dependency. The situation is under pressure as the conflicts between the 
state and NGOs have changed character. Earlier conflicts have mostly been about 
administrative issues, but now because of the integrated role NGO‟s play in the 
total assistance this might be changing.  
By using Hirschman‟s theory one can give an analysis of their options and where 
they can either exit their relationship or they can voice their concerns on how 
civil-military cooperation will affect humanitarian aid. Here, the choice of voice 
may lead to norm changes and new perceptions on the interaction between the 
state and NGOs. In a normal consumer-producer situation the consumer has the 
opportunity to exit the relationship at any given time, but with the Norwegian 
model the integral relationship between the state and NGOs has evolved over a 
long period of time leading to a convergence of aid and political interests. So in 
Hirschman‟s theory the interplay of loyalty is used to show how it can have an 
effect on how NGOs respond to diminishing alternatives.  
Given that there has traditionally been a large level of consensus and agreement 
in Norwegian politics particular in the relationship between humanitarian NGOs 
and the Norwegian government we can begin to appreciate why Norwegian 
NGOs have accepted the invitation by the state to work almost as development 
agents.  In exchange, they have been provided with generous funding and been 
given the opportunity to work on the issues they have found most interesting 
(Groth 1999:13). This agreement has, until now, been unproblematic because 
there has been little disagreement as to what aid policies in Norway should 
include. 
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2.4 Humanitarian theories 
The end of the 20
th
 century marked a change in armed conflicts which led to a 
decline in inhibitions to intervene in interstate conflicts (Goodhand 2006:1). This 
has also reinforced a change in the role played by NGOs. There is an increasingly 
stronger tie between humanitarian action and political objectives as well as a 
change in the overall policies from donor countries.  These changes are also 
reflected in the debate around humanitarian assistance. By using humanitarian 
theories one can also discuss the possibility that maybe the pressure for 
cooperation is not only an external factor from the government and military, but 
that it is also a growing view internally within the humanitarian community.  
From the traditional classical humanitarianism, locating itself outside political 
activity to the contemporary humanitarian landscape where humanitarian action is 
becoming an integral part of the strategy to approach conflicts (HPG report 
2001). There has been a fair amount of criticism towards traditional based 
humanitarian assistance. NGOs have been criticised for creating their own 
societies within societies and not interacting with the state, to the dependency 
debate and not being sensitive to how they affect some situations (Collier 2008, 
Fox 2001).  This makes it evident that there are many factors that influence the 
humanitarian imperative in today‟s conflicts.  
As said the „New humanitarianism‟ is the latest direction within humanitarianism 
and this direction is advocating for a more political sensitive form of aid. It 
represents a break from the traditional humanitarian approach advocated by the 
ICRC and it provides NGOs with a new banner, promoting conscious goal 
orientated aid that recognises that there is some links between aid, military action 
and diplomatic tools (Fox 2001). There is a new drive for coherence in new 
humanitarianism and under this coherence agenda, humanitarian action gets 
implemented into a comprehensive political strategy that makes the argument for 
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more cooperation between NGOs, the government and the military more 
legitimate (HPG report 2001).  
The ICRC has its fundamental principles that define their humanitarian space, as 
most of NGOs that work with humanitarian assistance and development.  This 
new form of humanitarianism is challenging these principles and argues that 
some of these principles, especially neutrality is outdated. New humanitarianism 
opens up for a widening of humanitarian policy and a more pragmatic approached 
to today‟s conflicts, while the traditional understanding of neutrality means that 
humanitarian assistance must stay as apolitical in nature as possible (Fox 2001). 
There is however been raised some concerns over how fare this can go, if NGOs 
are willing to have a pragmatic relationship to the principles of humanitarian aid, 
especially the one of neutrality, does not all of the principles stand in danger of 
loosing it s value? 
With NATO's CIMIC this new way of cooperating in complex conflicts is 
developing. The arguments for more cooperation mirror the increasing focus on 
coherence under the new humanitarianism (HPG report 2001). The new 
humanitarian approached is also compelling as it allows agencies to say that they 
are not politically naive (Fox 2001). It may however make it difficult for NGOs 
to maintain their ability to reach the weakest groups in a conflict situation, due to 
their lack of classical neutrality or due to political interests that may hinder their 
access (Shannon 2009).  
The ECHO report (2004) on the other hand, focuses on another aspect of this 
debate, and it links insecurity for humanitarian personal to the presence of 
military forces.  Linked to the case, Norway is a small country that has had little 
of non national interest to pursue on the international arena, making it easier for 
NGOs to keep a close relationship to each other. A coherent approach 
coordinating humanitarian and military actors would change this (NUPI 2010).  
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The main reason for why this would alter the relationship between the 
government and NGO today is due to Norway‟s military engagement in 
Afghanistan, it has given Norway a new profile, giving the debate of new and 
traditional humanitarian debate a second level to think about. Now Norway is 
following national interests, by being part of NATO's collision and leading a PRT 
team Norway‟s profile has changed.   
By using these theories one can also discuss the possibility that maybe the 
pressure for cooperation is not only an external factor from the government and 
military, but that it is also a growing view internally within the humanitarian 
community.  
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3. Method 
The methodology one chooses in a study will eventually affect the results
20
. This 
is one of the things one has to consider when one is doing a research study. The 
particular hypothesis for this thesis had not been studied broadly, but the concept 
of civil military cooperation had been and the same went for NGOs, the 
Norwegian model and the humanitarian approaches. Putting it all together meant 
that I needed to choose an approach that would let me pick out certain topics to 
study.  A lot of the data in this study is theoretical, but the outcome of the 
political shift will affect people in the real world. This is the reason why I went 
with a combination of three methods that allows me to study key questions 
regarding this unique situation; where the introduction of  a third partner, the 
military could have an impact on the relationship between the Norwegian 
government and Norwegian NGOs and have long-term affect on humanitarian 
assistance.  
3.1 Introduction: Qualitative research 
Qualitative research methods focus on studying phenomena in the real world 
placing its centre of attention on complexity rather then simplicity. Some 
qualitative research also holds the view that there is no single ultimate truth; but 
that the truth exists only as a multiple of perspectives all being equally valid 
(Leedy & Ormrod 2005: 133). By using a qualitative research method I have been 
able to compare different perspectives using written material such as documents, 
reports and plans from NGOs, the government and the military. I have also been 
able to do interviews to compare the written material with the perspectives of the 
                                              
20 http://www.filosofi.no/epist.html 
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individuals I have talked to, as well as academicals papers and articles from 
newspapers and information gathered at seminars and lectures. To carry out such 
an in-depth study a combination of three qualitative research methods have been 
used as guidelines: pragmatism, case study and phenomenological study. 
3.1.1 Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is a philosophical school within social science and it can be used 
when one wants to draw on various theoretical angles.  It also denies 
fundamentalism, the view that it is possible to find one true meaning once and for 
all (Cherryholms 1992:3) which is in coherence with the approach that I wanted 
to use. It also states that; 
“Research in a pragmatic tradition (...) seeks to clarify meaning and looks to consequences” (Cherryholms 1992:1). 
 
By using this method I can examine both the empirical and theoretical parts of 
CIMIC and the perceived consequences it may have for humanitarian aid.  
Pragmatism insists that it is the interplay of experience and theory that counts as 
knowledge (Hollis 1994:77).  This means that first of all knowledge is made 
through interpretation and new or added knowledge is made through 
reinterpretations. How things are interpreted is dependent on who interprets them, 
hence it follows that interpretations or knowledge, in the view of pragmatism, is 
subjective. One‟s view of consequences is therefore tainted with a prior 
knowledge built up by other interpretations of the „truth‟, or in this case due to 
normative integration, which I will come back to. This also makes pragmatism a 
good ground stone in analysing what underpins the differences between the 
Norwegian government, the Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian military. Their 
priority and experiences will influence their perception on how CIMIC will affect 
humanitarian aid. 
30 
 
3.1.2 Case study 
In a case study “a particular individual, program or event is studied in-depth” 
(Leedy & Ormrod 2005:135). In this thesis a single case study is used to 
understand the context around humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. This has 
been done by tracing the consequences it may have for the cooperative 
relationship between NGOs and the Norwegian state. The theoretical aspect of 
the Norwegian model and the empirical data on how civil-military cooperation 
developed by NATO influences humanitarian assistance is used to link the two 
levels of data. To make a case study I have gone through extensive literature on 
the situation in Afghanistan and the CIMIC discussion. I have also attended 
several debates and seminars held by different NGOs, organisations and 
academic circles. Throughout the process I have come in contact with different 
people working on issues about Afghanistan, CIMIC and aid they have been 
helpful in guiding me to new and interesting material. Talking too them has also 
given me important insight and understanding on the different perspectives. 
The situation in Afghanistan, and how the relationship between the military and 
NGOs are conducted there, I believe, will have a significant impact on how 
humanitarian assistance will function in the future. Using a case study has also 
been helpful since it has provided a common issue to discuss and link the various 
questions around civil-military cooperation gathered through my interviews. It 
has also functioned as a guideline as to how to conduct further research, who to 
contact as well as what kind of literature one should study.   
3.1.3 Epistemology 
”Everyone possess knowledge; most people know that the sky is blue, that horses have four legs, that the 
Eiffel Tower is in Paris, that the earth moves around the sun, that it is wrong to steal and if one is planning to take  
31 
 
an exam it is necessary to read for it to get a good grade. But how does one attain knowledge21? (Authors own 
translation). 
Epistemology address the question; what is knowledge, how it is acquired, what 
do people know and how do they know what they know. Epistemology attempts 
to understand how people acquire knowledge and how they utilizes this 
knowledge to interpretative the world around them
22
. This thesis looks at how the 
shift in policies is being perceived by NGOs and how they see this shift affecting 
humanitarian action. One core issue is therefore how civil-military cooperation is 
being perceived. There are three areas within epistemology that are important 
namely; terminology, objective and subjective. 
Terminology 
Definitions are problematic in epistemology because they move between the 
abstract and figurative.  A 'definition' is first of all understood as an abstract 
explanation of a 'term' without figurative meaning, and is given meaning through 
interpretation. The term itself gets figurative meaning through people‟s subjective 
interpretation.  So divergent perceptions of what civil-military cooperation is and 
means is not a strictly methodological problem (Bjerre 2007:14), but a subject-
object problem that puts the various actors at different platforms when they 
interpret civil-military cooperation.  
The subject-object problem: 
The “world consists of objects (entities) which are perceived or otherwise 
presumed to exist as entities, by subjects (observers)
23” 
                                              
21 http://www.filosofi.no/epist.html 25/4-2010 
22 http://www.menneskeligutvikling.no/index.php?site=default/179/189/285/288 26/4 2010 
23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subject-object_problem  26/4 2010  
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The subject-object question is concerned with the analysis of human experience. 
An objective statement in epistemology holds that there can be an objective truth 
independent of how anyone perceives it. While the subjective standpoint is that 
all knowledge or truth is acquired through a subjective interpretation of the social 
world
24
. 
By using this method I will try to show how experiences and reflections affect the 
interpretation of a situation. To study this I have conducted three interviews, two 
with people representing humanitarian NGO‟s (MSF and Red Cross) and one 
with a professor in political science. The perspective on civil-military cooperation 
from the Norwegian Government and the military is mostly derived from written 
sources, but also from seminars and meetings where the views on civil-military 
cooperation have been discussed. These meetings and seminars have been held 
under the Chatham rules
25
.  
The interviewees were semi-structural in form, so I had some pre-made questions 
and the interviews were informed on the main topic in advance. The positive side 
with semi-structural interviews is that one has some structure in the interview 
subjects and one can compare some of the answers to get some general 
perceptions. One has also the opportunity to conduct the interviews as a 
conversation, were one can easily can make follow up questions as one goes 
along and this makes it easier for me the researcher to listen to the participants 
and pick up meaningful information, that can be used further to find common 
themes and perceptions by the participants. 
                                              
24 Cf.: footnote No.23 
25 The „Chatham House Rule‟ is a rule that governs the confidentiality of the source of information received at a 
meeting. It states that: When a meeting or part there of, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are not 
free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker, nor that of any other 
participant, may be revealed in. 
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The interviews were face-to-face and the time aspect was from one to about three 
hours. In all of my interviews I used a tape recorder, which made the interviews 
easier as I could concentrate on the conversation and not need to take notes all the 
time. It was also useful to be able to listen to the interviews again later on in the 
writing process. 
3.2 Concluding remarks: 
The reason I have to choose several theories and methods is to try to conduct an 
integrated study that studies this issue from different angles. Linking the ground 
level perceptions from individuals that work in complex conflicts with the white 
paper statements and military reports will hopefully unveil different perspectives 
and what consequences this may have for humanitarian assistance. Three 
interviews are not sufficient to make a solid statement about the situation, but it 
did give me some knowledge about the Norwegian system as well as some insight 
to the experiences the humanitarian personnel experienced on the ground.   I have 
chosen to look at the big picture surrounding civil-military cooperation and tried 
to narrow it down to the Norwegian context and what this may have to say for the 
future of Norwegian humanitarian aid. By researching this topic in this particular 
way I may have neglected some questions, but hope that my conclusion as well as 
the questions I do ask will foster interest as well as contribute to further 
discussion. 
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4. The Norwegian model 
To study the relationship between the Norwegian government and the NGOs, the 
Norwegian model will be used as an explanatory model. It provides essential 
background information on how the Norwegian aid societies over time grow into 
an integrated part of the political sphere. It also provides a frame for discussing 
why the use of aid and humanitarian assistance as an incentive in foreign politics 
can be at odds with the consensus aspect and affect the relationship built between 
the Norwegian NGOs and the government 
4.1 From the outside, to the inside. 
Since the 1990s the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has worked 
on harmonizing foreign politics and the plans for Norwegian NGOs. This has 
resulted in what is known as the Norwegian model also referred to as the special 
relationship between the Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs. In 
Norway they have developed an informal and flexible relationship between the 
state and NGOs. Tvedt (2003:305) emphasizes that this is especially evident 
within development and humanitarian context, where the ministry of foreign 
affairs (MFA), research institutes and NGOs are growing closer together. 
The first and main reason for Norway having this type of model is the national 
formation. The society and NGOs have not established themselves in contrast to 
each other, which have been the case in many other countries. The second reason 
is external factors. Very early on the international aid system understood the 
benefits of involving a larger part of the society. Norway has been particularly 
identified with this model due to the large amount of state funding NGOs receive 
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each year (Tvedt 2003). In 2009, 1/5 of all Norwegian aid got channelled through 
NGOs (Solheim 2009 [speech]). 
This has had a twofold effect, some NGOs working with development and 
humanitarian aid has grown big, strong and some claim bureaucratically. Within 
the aid society, there is often talked about the „5 larges‟ ones; the Norwegian Red 
Cross, the Norwegian refugee council, Church Aid, Norwegian people aid and 
Save the Children that have developed into vital actors and partners to the 
government in this field (Øvrebø 1995). The usage of NGOs has been an 
important instrument for Norway.  This close relationship opens up for the 
Norwegian system to have more channels than traditional (MFA plan 2000). The 
MFA (2006) takes it a step further stating that this close relationship have given 
„Norway a small-state advantage‟ highlight that the relationship makes it easier 
to go into conflicts and have a „long-term plan and secure funding plans‟ (MFA 
plan 2006:).  
On the other side some NGOs have become dependent of the state due to the 
funding they get. Even if there is no 1-1 relationship between finance and 
autonomy this process have developed over a long period of time so trough the 
integration perspective it is likely to presume that this has had an impact on their 
relationship (Lorentzen 1994). The interesting part to this is to see if this also has 
an impact when studying the challenges of more cooperation between civilian 
and military actors. Will their close relationship become a factor in the way civil-
military cooperation is perceived and handle. 
White paper 35(2003-04) shows a considerable shift in Norwegian policy by 
connecting aid and political interest. Here development, NGOs and the civilian 
society gets described as vital tools that Norway can use to reach its millennium 
development goals, (MDG). The foundation for the Norwegian model also 
expands with this white paper, aid is no longer understood as a act of charity and 
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provided based on poorly need alone, but is following the new norm set where 
development is closely linked to the „right‟ approached (NUPI 2004:5) where 
humanitarian action is considerate to be a legally agreed goal (HPG 2001). The 
expansion is relevant to today‟s picture due to the merger of development and 
foreign aid politics on one side and a merger of foreign and defense politics on 
the other side (Goodhand 2008).  These mergers is putting the needs versus rights 
debate on the agenda for NGOs, it brings on the question „what moral grounds 
humanitarian aid should be provided? There are to camps that connect themselves 
to the humanitarian discussion.  As presented in chapter 2.4, one side of the 
debate there is the traditional front, wanting to keep humanitarian aid „value 
free‟, while the other side want assistance with a “meaning”. The new from of 
humanitarianism is questioning the traditional response and principle, saying that 
the traditional form is not up to date if they are claiming to be a political.  
The use of NGOs as instruments in Norwegian foreign politics has received 
revitalized attention due to resent developments and issues like the nature of 
today‟s conflicts and the humanitarian debate that are challenging all actors 
involved in new ways. Norway‟s cooperative advantage as a “small and neutral 
country” in foreign politics (NUPI 2009, Tvedt 2003) is in danger because of this 
integrated way of operating.  
4.1.1 Historical background: The Norwegian model 
This short historical backdrop will give the outlines of the historical development 
of the relationship between the Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs. 
Norway‟s model is unique due to the amount of funding and the size of the 
system, no other country has so many organisations working with the government 
in this way. The closeness between the NGOs and the Norwegian government is 
also a trademark that is unique for Norway; it shows that within the Norwegian 
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system there is a high level of consensus between the different actors (Tvedt 
2003).  
The trend of donating aid by channelling it through NGOs started in the 1960s
26
.  
The main reason for channelling money through organisations was that it would 
be easier to increase support around aid and assistance (Tvedt 2003). However in 
the 1990s there was a reaction to the alleged comparative advantaged NGOs, as 
supposed to channelling aid through other types of state institutions.  This critic 
led to a change in the rational for why Norway was using NGOs as the main 
channel for aid. They where thought  to be closer to the „grassroots‟ organisations 
in the receiver countries so their mission changed towards supporting civil 
society in the receiver country and setting focus on good governance and 
democratisation (Borchgrevink 2006 in Grøndahl 2008:22, Tvedt 2003 ).     
Terje Tvedt (2003:55) explains that he uses the term the Norwegian model as a 
reference to the integration processes that has lead to the system one has today. 
The model gives a picture of how the relationship between the NGOs, state and 
the research society has been organised. He amplifies the importance of consensus 
between the different actors. But this ground stone in the model is best explained 
through Jan Egeland‟s 1988:18527 own words cited in Tvedt (2003:59) 
“Norway‟s potential for political entrepreneurship lays in policy consensus, few 
conflicting foreign policy interests and increasing founds for foreign assistance”. 
This statement shows that there could be problems ahead concerning the 
consensus aspect of the Norwegian model. Especially now, when the focus on 
cooperation and integration has led several NGOs to voice their concerns about 
how this may affect humanitarian assistance. One of the concerns raised is the 
                                              
26 Terje Tvedt (2003:81) sets the date to the 17th of august 1962 
27 Former leader for Norwegian Red Cross, sate secretary and UN mediator amongst other tings. 
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use of aid as a strategic instrument, which has not been the norm in Norwegian 
politics best illustrated by the fact that development politics and Norwegian 
foreign politics has, as said, developed apart from each other. When Norwegian 
aid first got established in the 1960s the intention at the international level for 
other countries was to use aid as an agent preventing communism to spread 
through what was then called the third world. While in Norway developmental 
aid got institutionalised outside the department of foreign affairs as if it had no 
relation too Norwegian foreign policy interests  (Tvedt: 2003).  
Norway‟s Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) has the main 
responsibility in co-ordinating aid and aid projects and is the directorate for 
foreign aid as a separate actor. In 2004 there was a reorganization of the 
relationship between NORAD and MFA and some parts of NORAD got 
incorporated in under the MFA. NORAD remained a separate department, but 
NORAD‟s main workload is now connected to evaluation of Norwegian aid and 
aid programs as well as administrative resources that get channeled through 
different NGOs (Tvedt 2003). This incorporating process did not, however, affect 
the way the state and the NGOs define their relationship; as independent of each 
other. The reason behind this perception is the history between the Norwegian aid 
and foreign policies stipulated in a neutrality clause that ensured that Norwegian 
humanitarian aid was founded on humanitarian principles alone. The clause 
stated; “It is important that aid which is donated to less developed countries is 
donated without political, economical or religious strings attached” (Lie 
2006:141
28
.) In front of the reorganization of NORAD and the MFA, there was 
also a reorganization of the state budget. By moving some of the budget post 
around it would become easier to develop a more coherent strategy regarding aid 
funding (St.prp. no 1 2001-2002).  
                                              
28 Authors own translation. 
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This clause was removed three years before the reorganization between NORAD 
and the MAF. The removal of this clause signals that the clause has played out its 
role and is no longer needed as a guideline. According to Tvedt (2003:109) the 
clause got removed due to the symbolic significance of presenting aid as a 
„common‟ interest. One can therefore argue that by presenting aid as a common 
interest the separation between political interest and apolitical interest is removed 
and a more coherent picture of Norwegian aid politics and aid practices can be 
made.  
4.2 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided with a historical backdrop to the Norwegian model and 
explained how the integration of Norwegian NGOs has developed over time. The 
politic consensus that has been somewhat of a backbone to the Norwegian model 
seems to be under pressure now that Norway‟s government is moving towards a 
more integrated approach in Afghanistan. In the Norwegian political sphere there 
have been done strategically moves to integrate the Norwegian NGOs further to 
the political sphere. The removal of the neutral clause and the re-organization of 
NORAD and the budget change are altercations done to bring the two spheres 
closer together and to create a more coordinated platform. Making a coherent 
platform many be useful in achieving a more efficient Norwegian effort, but it 
also closes down the options for Norwegian NGOs, by becoming an integrated 
part of the Norwegian system they may have difficult time remaining neutral, 
independent and impartial when the third partner arrives. 
 The Norwegian model is unique as said, for different reasons but mostly due to 
its flexible fashion where the use of Norwegian NGOs as partners gives Norway 
advantages that few other countries have. If the principles underlining this are 
changing it is likely that this will present itself in some way that will affect the 
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model and the Norwegian aid system. The cooperation focus and the extended 
use of a national based system in Norway‟s involvement in other complex 
conflicts stands to affect the consensus principle that the relationship between the 
Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs have.  It is also a question of 
security whether or not this is a healthy trend for Norwegian NGOs, one way 
NGOs are staying safe in the field is trough their humanitarian space, upheld by 
their three core principles, but if Norwegian NGOs are forced to cooperate with a 
third armed party their security net may be damaged and Norwegian NGOs will 
be associated with political agendas  
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5. The case of Afghanistan 
In 2001 Afghanistan was described as one of the world biggest humanitarian 
disasters, after decades of conflicts, wars and natural disasters the country was 
seen as a failed state and as one of the least developed countries in the world 
(CMI report: 2005:11).  The fall of the Taliban regime became the start of a new 
international commitment to Afghanistan.  This thesis uses the situation in 
Afghanistan as a case to show how the context around humanitarian aid is 
changing. Afghanistan shows the new type of conflicts humanitarian, military and 
donor countries are facing and Afghanistan has become a testing ground for the 
new paradigm that has developed between the different actors. Intra-state 
conflicts and failed states are demanding broader approaches and are challenging 
how far one can go to establish these forms of approaches without undermining 
each actor‟s independent role, especially the role played by the humanitarian 
actors. 
5.1 Introduction: Dimentions of conflict 
In the period 1979-2001 the country went from a cold war proxy to a regionalized 
civil war. In 1978 diverse Islamic groups got together and formed a resistance 
group as a response to the communist party, People‟s democratic party of 
Afghanistan, gaining control in the country. This led the Soviet Union to invade 
Afghanistan in 1979. The resistance group called the Mujahedin was financed by 
the US. After nearly ten years the Soviet forces withdrew in 1989 causing the 
Afghan state to nearly collapse (Goodland 2006:18). In the aftermath old 
differences became more visible and when the communist government was 
brought down in 1992, Taliban appeared in the power vacuum that followed. 
Four years later in 1996 Taliban gained control of the capital city Kabul, and just 
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a small fraction in the northern part of the country remained outside of Taliban 
influence (CMI report 2007).  
When Taliban was in charge many restrictions on what kind of humanitarian 
assistance that could be delivered was made, as well as whom  could deliver it,  
one of the restrictions was that female aid workers was not allowed. Due to the 
many restrictions donor interest declined, in 1995 the total amount aid donated 
from the international community was US$ 200 million (CMI 2005:1). However 
today Afghanistan has become one of the world‟s largest recipients of aid, but 
due to a web of conflicts and conflict lines, external actors are having a hard time 
sorting out all the different factors that are affecting the situation that they are 
facing. According to Frereks et al. (2006), it is possible to group the most 
common internal conflict lines: 
“a) imperial and domestic (dynastic) struggles for power and state control; b) ethnic, religious and regional 
identities and affiliations; c) patterns of feudalism, political patronage and warlordism; d) economies of violence, 
especially in relation to drugs; and e) interference by superpowers, regional powers, and neighboring 
countries.”(Frereks et al. 2006:41) 
Afghanistan‟s geographical position has always been a subject for foreign 
interest. All the different groups that has struggled for control in Afghanistan has 
been in some way or another interested in Afghanistan due to the fact that it is 
located in the crossroads between west, south and central Asia.  
 “Afghanistan‟s (…) strategic position in the age of colonial empire and during the cold war, it always has 
been subject to foreign interference. Many Afghans are keen to point out that communism, the Mujahedeen, the 
Taliban, Al Qaeda and even the government were to some extent foreign machinations” (Frereks et al. 2006:41). 
 
Today, this geopolitical perception is still legitimate; the international interest in 
Afghanistan is still interlinked to security and the strategic location of 
Afghanistan. Julian Lindley-French (2009), a member of the Atlantic Council's 
Strategic Advisors Group, and Professor of Military Art and Science at the Royal 
Military Academy in the Netherlands, also emphasizes that the overall strategic 
objective in Afghanistan is to make “a relatively stable Afghanistan as a counter 
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to Al Qaeda-style terrorism” (2009:229).  In other words by creating a stable 
Afghanistan one is hoping to ensure global security.  
 
Other  underlying conflicts that the external armed forces, humanitarian and 
donor countries has to deal with in order to reestablish Afghanistan as a stable 
country with functional state structures is the level of human development “due to 
decades of warfare and state negligence, Afghanistan‟s development has suffered 
and been seriously wounded. Development wise Afghanistan‟s population scores 
low on human development indicators, especially women have been neglected 
(Frereks et al 2006:41-42). Weak state structures and the lack of stability are also 
issues that foreign actors have to deal with in order to reestablish a secure 
Afghanistan. Frereks et al. (2006) further argue that the state authority in 
Afghanistan is weak due to the state formation with little or no authority outside 
Kabul (Frereks et al 2006: 41).  NATO‟s PRT forces mandate is to work 
especially on the last issue facing foreign actors in Afghanistan; the lack of state 
authority outside Kabul. 
5.2 Humanitarian assistance and aid from Norway to 
Afghanistan 
There are several Norwegian NGOs operating in Afghanistan, during the reseach 
for this thesis I have been in contact with two organisations that both have 
worked in Afghanistan for many years.  
Red Cross 
Red Cross functions as a partner of national society  (PNS), that means that they 
work together through the Afghan-led Red Crescent Movement in Afghanistan. 
                                              
29 
http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:LtSQC2ohmCsJ:scholar.google.com/+gaining+stability+in+Afghanistan&hl=
en&as_sdt=2000  
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At the time of my inquiry Red Cross was the only organisation in Afghanistan 
working as a PNS. Since 2002 Red Cross have had the responsibility for the 
Afghan ambulance service in Kabul. They have prioretised questions regarding 
community-based first aid and mother and child health care.  
Mèdecins Sans Frontieres 
Mèdecins sans Frontieres had worked in 13 provinces and in over 24 years when 
they left Afghanistan in 2004. There are several reasons for their withdrawal, but 
the security issues and a direct attack against one of MSF‟s cars, resulting in the 
death of several humanitarian officers, has been indicated as being the main 
reasons for them leaving the area
30
. Today, five years after they left Afghanistan, 
they are back, working in Kabul. They report on their webpage that they are not 
receiving any government funding for their work in Afghanistan, but are solely 
using private donations
31
. 
5.2.1 Aid from Norway to Afghanistan 
An annual report from NORAD on bilateral aid from 2007
32
 showed that the 
Norwegian bilateral aid had focused on economic development and trade, 
emergency help, environment and energy, good governance and the social sector 
in Afghanistan (NORAD 2007:29-30). The funding had been channelled through 
a multitude of channels, but mostly through multinational organisations and 
NGOs. Larger Norwegian contributions where made to the Norwegian refugee 
consul (NRC) and the UN refugee organisation UNHCR. So even though the 
Norwegian government states that state-to-state funding is the best way to 
                                              
30 http://www.sportsresepsjonen.no/node/66  
31 http://www.legerutengrenser.no/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=4D4F2950-15C5-F00A-
250645F3AAE28285&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html  
32 Published in October 2008 
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strengthen the bilateral relationship between countries, Norway is also to some 
extent following the trend of bypassing the Afghan government.  The issue of 
bypassing is connected to the need for the Afghan government to be perceived as 
reliable by the afghan people. The trend of bypassing is makes this difficult to 
achieve. 
In the context of Norway‟s contribution to Afghanistan, the bypassing of the 
Afghan government can be related to the fact that Norway has developed an 
extensive development assistance program in the Northern parts of Afghanistan 
where it also heads the Provincial reconstruction team (PRT). In 2006-07 the 
province received 41, 59 million NOK in direct Norwegian support; in addition 
Norway gave funding to national programs (CMI 2007:1).  
The allocation of aid, military effort and humanitarian assistance in one area like 
this raises concerns about the humanitarian principles of independence, because it 
implies a growing coherence between political objectives and humanitarian 
assistance. Followed by the use of special funds to make NGO more involved in 
high profile area, some NGOs change their profile to receive these funds. Terje 
Tvedt (2003:90-91) argue that several NGO sets up projects that fit into the 
governments‟ objectives or future development programs to ensure further 
funding  (Tvedt 2003: 90-91).  
One of the main arguments to use NGOs is due to their comparative precedence 
that organizations have makes them important as development partners. This is 
one of the core arguments for why NGOs and humanitarian aid workers are 
concerned about the trend towards more civil-military coordinated operations 
pushed by different actors. The NGOs that wants to follow the ethical framework 
advocated by ICRC are afraid that they may lose the acceptance that they are 
dependent on to do their work if this trend continues. 
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Another issue that Norwegian NGOs face in Afghanistan is the level of difficulty 
connected to the issue of clear lines between „short term relief assistance‟ 
projects and „long term development‟ programs. The line gets blurred and merges 
into one another. In Afghanistan the focus of NGOs and donors generally still are 
relief-orientated, but the strategic framework in which NGOs now operate in 
have strong links to political and assistance strategies (Goodhand 2006). 
Seen in this light, the NGOs that fear it may come to a point where NATO, a 
military organ, will control what kind of project they may follow can have a good 
point. “That only “fit” into the NATO concept of security”. White paper no. 39 
(2003-2004):28) “Samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-militært samarbeid”33 states that 
the Norwegian government wants clarity in the roles of civil and military actors, 
but that there will be times when the only option is to use military forces to 
conduct what normally would be labelled as civil activities because of the 
security situation.  
5.2.2 Military contribution to Afghanistan 
Norway‟s relationship with Afghanistan and the South-Asian region was 
presumed to be marginal or be mostly connected trough trade and aid (Frøystad 
1995:415). This changed after 2001 when the UN Security Council declared that 
the situation in Afghanistan was a “threat against peace” and “a matter of 
international security” (Støre 2008 [speech]). NATO‟s main role in Afghanistan 
is to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in gaining control and stabilise 
the environment.  This is done through its UN-mandated International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF‟s engagement in Afghanistan started as an 
operation limited to Kabul, but this has changed and now ISAF is working all 
over Afghanistan. Today, all NATO member nations are contributing with forces 
                                              
33  Eng. Translation: Human security and civil military cooperation 
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in Afghanistan.  ISAF‟s main tasks in Afghanistan is security, reconstruction and 
development and governance.
34
 
Norway is leading a PRT in Meymaneh, located in the Faryab province in the 
northwest of Afghanistan. The PRT mandate by ISAF is to“ to assist the 
Government of Afghanistan (GoA) to extend its authority in order to facilitate the 
development of a stable and secure environment(…) and enable security sector 
reforms and reconstruction efforts”35.   There are 2636 PRTs in Afghanistan and 
each of them has their own approach to this assignment, but they are all 
encouraged to include other elements, beside their military component. The 
Norwegian lead PRT in Meymaneh consists of two main pillars, a military one 
and a civilian one. The goal with PRT is to create „system-wide or multi-
dimensional impact on the reconstruction goals and objectives of the 
international intervention‟ (NUPI Report 2009:29).  
Norway‟s humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan has a wider focus than its 
military engagement, which is Meymaneh.  The Norwegian embassy in 
Afghanistan has the coordinating role for most of development and humanitarian 
assistance that Norway give to Afghanistan.  They oversee about 70% of the 
funds that are distributed to UN projects, Norwegian NGOs and others. “This way 
of delegating responsibility throughout the distribution of aid is a result of an 
explicit Norwegian strategy” (NUPI 2009:34) based in the relationship the 
Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs have.   
The Norwegian strategy in Afghanistan is to create a „whole of government 
approach‟ that harmonises Norway‟s contribution to Afghanistan. The problem 
                                              
34 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm?selectedLocale=en  
35 http://www.mzv.cz/prtlogar/en/learn_more/isaf_mandate_and_prt_mission/index.html 
36  Cf.: footnote No.35 
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becomes the relationship between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian 
NGOs. Due to the context in which they operate in Afghanistan they may be 
perceived as an integral part of the military and political assignment in 
Afghanistan.  In Afghanistan the Norwegian military is playing a leading role, 
and the effect this may have is assumed to most likely to be negative if a link 
between the military and Norwegian NGO are made (NUPI Report 2009:23-25).  
In the discussion about what effects civil-military cooperation has on 
humanitarian aid the PRTs are often pointed out as the main reason for blurring 
of roles, due to the fact that their reconstruction projects, also known quick 
impact projects, often involve rebuilding of roads, buildings and other necessities 
like water wells
37
. These are all projects usually connected to NGOs development 
programs. It is turning the discussion into what falls under the label 
„humanitarian assistance‟ and „development work‟, and since the Norwegian 
government has stated that there need to be clear roles between what is 
humanitarian work and what is military work this issue is challenging this 
statement. Even tough there is a notion by the government that it is through a 
clear understanding of roles cooperation can prosper. The PRTs mission 
statement opens the door for PRTs to do developmental work such as building  
roads, as a facilitating act for further development in the area (Shannon 2009:25).  
After 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq became the main recipients of aid and 
humanitarian assistance from almost all of The Development Assistance 
Committee‟s member countries (DAC)38 (Harang 2008:102). The United 
Kingdom more then doubled its aid contribution to Afghanistan and Norway‟s 
donation to humanitarian aid doubled in 2008 and is currently NOK 750 
                                              
37 http://www.mil.no/fol/afg/start/dagboker/meymaneh/article.jhtml?articleID=126199  
38 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues 
related to co-operation with developing countries. 
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million
39
. The correlation between aid, political focus and military strategic 
investments looks to be strong when it comes to high profile conflicts such as 
Afghanistan. In high profile conflicts there seems to be a concentration of 
humanitarian assistance. According to Braem (2008:40), this concentration of 
assistance is often connected to a geopolitical division of labor, which 
corresponds with the distribution of global military power, followed by the 
world‟s distribution of humanitarian assistance. He further argues that this 
geopolitical division of military power demonstrates how the military forces are 
deployed in the different conflicts.  
High profiled conflicts are conflicts were northern/rich countries participate with 
military and humanitarian assistance, while conflicts of less strategic value 
become UN-led peacekeeping staffed by countries from Latin America, Africa 
and the Indian sub-continent (Braem 2008) This is also one of the topics the 
civilian actors raise in the discussions on civil-military cooperation and its effects 
on NGOs. Their concern is that the focus on staying neutral and impartial can be 
undermined when there is such a clear correlation between strategic interest and 
humanitarian aid.  
If one looks at the flip side of the coin, the massive arrival of NGOs to conflict 
areas like Afghanistan after military intervention answers the question of „which 
side of the conflict they are on‟. Especially in Afghanistan where many NGOs 
who had little or no experience in the region, are now working with development 
and humanitarian assistance (Braem 2008).  This indicates that the effect of 
policies must not always be perceived as a one way street, the use of NGOs in 
high profile conflicts can be brought about by themselves and therefore the 
questions surrounding their neutrality can be legitimate. 
                                              
39 http://www.norad.no/Land/Asia+og+Oseania/Afghanistan 
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5.3 Concluding remarks  
The situation in Afghanistan is highly uncertain and the level of stability goes 
back and forth. Norway is engaged in the conflict in Afghanistan through both 
humanitarian and military assistance. The Norwegian government is now saying 
that they want to follow the international trend and developed a “whole of 
government” model in Afghanistan, trying to coordinate its civilian and military 
effort in a more coherent way.  The critic toward this form of coordination is that 
they tend to become too static and the flexibility one has without them becomes 
lost (SCHR 2010). There is also the security debate on how this may affect the 
NGOs that are working in Afghanistan if a whole of government plan is 
executed. 
In relation to the Norwegian effort the down side to this model is that it will most 
likely affect the perception of the Norwegian humanitarian effort.  It is likely that 
the small state advantage Norway usually has will be lost in Afghanistan due to 
the role Norway have as a military actor.   The focus on „Whole of government 
approaches‟ is not unique, what is unique it that Norway is presuming this whey 
of coordinating when Norway have the Norwegian model to consider. This shows 
that the government and NGOs are not viewing the consequences of this merger 
the same way. While the government is looking to make the Norwegian effort 
more efficient the NGOs are worried that this type of coordinated effort my 
seriously hurt their reputation. 
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6. Civil-military cooperation and changing roles. 
The debate around civil-military cooperation has not developed in a vacuum, but 
is a result of the changes that have developed within „humanitarian assistance, 
military strategies and development‟ (Frerks et al. 2006:21). The altered 
conditions in today‟s conflicts have led several actors to adjust to the current 
situation; more civil-military cooperation is one of these adjustments.  Civil-
military cooperation must be understood in a context where conflicts are 
becoming increasingly more difficult to handle.  Conflicts that are confined 
within a state border might evolve and become international security hazards. The 
concern is how they affect Norwegian security in the long run (White paper no.13 
2008-2009):60). The level of complexity in many of these conflicts is challenging 
and requires both multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional response models. The 
share volume of actors and the lack of consensus, coordination and coherence 
between them have in some cases lead to actors struggling with each other over 
resources and roles (NUPI Rapport 2008). In the end, it stands to affects the 
quality of aid and assistance to those who depend on it the most.  
This has led the EU, NATO and the UN as well as several NGOs and some 
governments
40
 to develop various forms of civil-military cooperation through 
coordination doctrines, guidelines and handbooks
41
. These guiding principles 
have made it possible for them to work together, or interlink their activities in 
such a way that they have been able to function somewhat coherently. 
                                              
40Countries like Finland, UK and the US have all developed Civil-Military Cooperation concepts 
41 The UN has developed two definitions of civil-military coordination one by the  UN department of peace keeping 
(DPKO) and  one definition by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).The European 
union‟s Military committee endorsed Civil military concepts for EU led crises Management Operations in march 
2002. Several NGOs have trough NGO coordinating efforts made guidelines to how humanitarian actors should 
interact with military actors in the field; example the MCDA guidelines 2004. 
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6.1 Introducton: What is Civil-military cooperation?  
In this chapter the different perspectives on civil-military cooperation will be 
studied.  How do the three main actors view this approach, what are their main 
differences? And what underpins these differences? Are their perspectives so far 
apart that cooperation is unattainable? Or are their differences marginal and can 
be worked out?  Will this lead to changes to the current relationship between the 
Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government and in the long run affect 
humanitarian assistance? 
According to Ankersen (2008:3) the first question one ought to ask when 
studying how civil-military cooperation is perceived, is to establish if it is 
understood as a „side track‟ or a „core activity‟. In Ankersens article he is first 
and foremost interested in how military actors view civil-military cooperation, 
but this line of inquiry will also reveal how other actors perceive this approach. 
These questions can also determine what effects civil-military cooperation will 
have in the future. 
The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, has stated that  “In 
order to succeed in Afghanistan there need  to be a civil-military coordinated 
strategy, where the political processes are enhanced” (Jonas Gahr Støre[speech] 
2008). This statement together with White paper no. 39 (2003-2004) from the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and White paper no. 15 (2008-2008) from the MFA, 
supports the  idea that more cooperation between the different actors, as well as 
more cooperation between the different political departments is one way to 
achieve a more coherent approach. The main guidelines for creating clearly 
defined roles between the military and humanitarian actors will be trough 
coordination between the different actors throughout the different phases of the 
operation. The main goal should be to use the resources made available more 
efficient and try to lay the best foundation for stabilisation, peace and re-building. 
53 
 
The military, NATO‟s role in this is to ensure security and stability so that the 
humanitarian actors can operate (White paper 39(2003-04):28).  
Even though the statement made by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs  
indicates that civil-military cooperation is a vital entity, or to use Ankersens term; 
a „core-activity‟, in the progress towards sustainable stability in Afghanistan, the 
Norwegian government  has been careful not to advocate for an approach that 
disregards the humanitarian principles as base for humanitarian assistance . The 
Norwegian government goes far in advocating in favour of preserving the 
humanitarian space (Evne til innsats 2009:70 Article 154). The main criticism 
towards NATO‟s ISAF forces have been that they have not been able to do this42 
and therefore is failing one of their main objectives, gaining stability in the 
country. Thus the Norwegian government has supported an approach where a 
clear division of labour is viewed as a way to gain consensus, coherence and 
cooperation and not create more diversity. 
The epistemology method presented in chapter 3.1.3 suggests that different 
experiences provide different forms of knowledge and that this later on affects 
how one perceives the world. So when studying how civil-military cooperation 
and co-ordinate efforts are viewed by different actors, one must keep in minds 
that their viewpoint is tainted by their own experiences and their own focus. The 
first feature to examine to find out the differences between military and 
humanitarian view of civil military cooperating is to study the underlining issues, 
one of them being the relationship the Norwegian government have to the 
military and the NGOs.  
While NGOs have several alliances and divided loyalties, military forces are state 
servants (HPG report 2001). In this case the military actor NATO, functioning as 
                                              
42 http://www.morgenbladet.no/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071109/OAKTUELT/711090016/0/AKTUELT 
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Norway‟s first line of security, NATO's view on cooperation will influence 
Norway‟s security policies. Within NATO there is a growing perception that 
civil-military coordinated operations should be a concrete tool to contribute to 
stability and development. Combining military and civilian means is also used in 
EU-governed operations.  This has made the EU a key actor in international 
security policies (White paper no. 15 2008-2009): 30). So even though the 
Norwegian government has largely been in favor of holding the roles of civilian 
and military effort separated, the development in NATO, as well as in other 
international arenas, is surely challenging the Norwegian policies in this area. 
The task of  bringing humanitarian and military actors together on this issue and 
creating a sustainable model does presuppose some amount of agreements like; 
shared platforms of value, principles and priorities to develop some form of 
common framework (NUPI:2008). This is for the most part lacking according to 
Kristin M. Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho‟s discussion paper for (2007) 
“Civil military cooperation in multinational and interagency operations” they 
think it is highly unlikely for; 
“Military personnel making use of conceptual frameworks developed by civilian actors or vice 
versa. In addition, and due to the large military-civilian as well as intra-civilian differences when it 
comes to planning, working procedures, and end-goals, it is doubtful that such overall concepts would 
even be meaningful or adequate in the field” (Haugevik & Carvalho 2007:10). 
One reason for them to draw this conclusion is that the institutionalization of 
civil-military cooperation methods have for the most part been dominated by 
military approaches, humanitarian and civilian groups that have tried to 
collaborate with their military counterparts feel that they are being co-opted into 
aid paradigms where humanitarian policies are not the dominating factor (HPG 
Report 2001). According to Meinrad Studer (2001:380) a diplomatic adviser to 
the ICRC‟s International Organizations Division “The military tend to assume 
that since they are responsible for security, they should play the lead role in 
coordinating operations”. For humanitarian actors this view is alarming since the 
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military can easily become part of the problem. Therefore they hold that the 
military never should have a leading role in any operation that involves 
humanitarian components. This view is also presented in the IASC reference 
paper (2009) made by the UN and IASC and the MCDA (2003) guidelines that 
was developed with the collaboration of a broad representation of the 
international humanitarian community and other committees representing a 
diverse spectre of countries and organisations
43
.  
The current challenge for the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs 
is connected to the interpretation of what cooperation means and the saying 
“where you sit, depends on where you stand” comes to mind. The patchwork of 
operational environments that both humanitarian action and military action are 
facing is becoming more and more challenging.  The definitions on civil-military 
cooperation presented at the start of this thesis hold two different themes. 
NATO‟s definition holds a military-centric position in comparison to the 
definition presented by IASC which ranges from „cooperation‟ to „coexistence‟. 
The coexistence view comes close to the outline of what traditional humanitarian 
NGOs wants to maintain; keeping the focus on communication and equal 
information sharing based on security measurements and not strategy purposes 
(de Coning 2008). 
The main focus of NATO‟s definition is placed at the tactical level, or mission 
level, in contrast to the civilian definition. One reason behind the different levels 
of defining can be connected to the organizational and cultural differences 
between the military and NGOs.  While military institutions are characterized by 
                                              
43 A drafting Committee consisting of representatives of Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Sudan, 
Switzerland, UK, USA, DPKO, SCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, as well as a Review Committee consisting of 
representatives of Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, 
India, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian 
Federation,Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia, COE, ECHO, EC, EUMS, ICDO, ICRC, ICVA, 
INTERACTION, IOM, NATO, OCHA, THW and WHO. 
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command and control, top-down structures and clear lines of authority. NGOs on 
the other side tend to be horizontal and organized with decisions being made 
along the way. They also pay more attention to socio-cultural questions because 
they tend to have a long term perspective (Jenny 2001). The military on the other 
hand uses development projects as quick impact projects, without considering the 
long-term effects of their contributions (Lundes 2008 [speech]). The criticism 
from the humanitarian body is that this falls under development work, which they 
view as their field of operation. While the military holds that it is strictly 
humanitarian emergency assistance they need to stay clear of (Jenny 2001).   
Political actors view the use of the Norwegian model in international affairs as a 
natural extension of their relationship to Norwegian NGOs (NUPI 2009).  The 
Norwegian government is seeing this as a way to incorporate Norwegian NGOs 
into a comprehensive framework (Tvedt 2003, Lie 2006). Norwegian NGOs are 
starting to see this as a possible obstacle in their work
44
. Arguing that due to this 
cooperative from of working NGOs are in danger of being integrated into a 
framework that might affect the way NGOs are perceived. NGOs are therefore 
using the humanitarian principles as argument against too much coordination.  
Raising the issue of the relationship between them, as neutral partner, and the 
military which are  dependent state partners constantly subject to political control 
(Frangonikolopoulos 2005: 53).  The consensus aspect of the Norwegian model 
is diminishing with little agreement on the level of impact a third partner will 
have and how using NGOs as political instruments will affect their reputation.  
Trine Linnè Eriksen, professor of Development studies at Høgskolen in Oslo 
argues that the shifts within Norwegian aid policies has led to the death of the 
Norwegian model altogether since this change alters the basis and character of 
                                              
44  http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Etterlyser-upolitisk-bistand-450104.html).  
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Norwegian aid
45
. She argues that the first political shifts, that killed the model 
was when the Norwegian government aligned itself with the economical reforms 
presented by the world bank and IMF in the 90s, this lead the focus away from 
where it should be, namely poverty reduction and  not the size of government 
control. The second factor leading to the death of the Norwegian model was the 
Uruguay negotiations, where the Nordic counties along with the rest of the West 
have high barriers against trading with the South. Today, she argues that it is the 
changing policies and the massive funding going to political hot-spots that is 
killing the model. When there is no independent  steering wheel for Norwegian 
aid  and in Norway is following the direction of where NATO or USA are 
currently operating, then the policies behind the model has  shifted  too far away 
from the ideal the Norwegian model should represent.  
6.1.1  Other issues connected to civil-military cooperation 
Context dependency is another issue raised in NUPI (2009) and Hugo Slim 
(2004) when it comes to the debate about civil-military cooperation and the 
impact it may hold for humanitarian assistance. Both the report and Slim argue 
that due to the current situation Afghanistan today, civil-military cooperation has 
become a significant part of the strategy in regaining stability. It is argued that; it 
would be a mistake to base the entire discussion about what effects civil-military 
cooperation may hold for NGOs and humanitarian assistance in the future solely 
based on the practise and development in Afghanistan today. There need not be a 
crossover effect between the situation in Afghanistan and other conflicts, but it 
may set an example that is easily followed (Slim 2004). This means that the 
effects of civil-military cooperation must be considered in relation to the situation 
at hand and therefore it is likely that any changes and effects will be strongly 
                                              
45 http://www.dagbladet.no/2010/04/12/kultur/debatt/kronikk/bistand/11240925/ online 
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context-dependent. As Eriksen (2010) argued above there seems to be a link 
between the political changes and how aid is distributed.  Knight (2008) argues 
that there seems to be a similar connection to the use of „coherency‟ and the „war 
against terror‟. He argues that there is an increase in approaches that are referred 
to as coherent or that are otherwise multidisciplinary in form when it comes to 
conflicts that can be connected to “the global war on terror” (GWOT). He further 
argues that when there are conflicts in connection to the GWOT, one will observe 
approaches that are based on civil-military coordination merging humanitarian 
assistance and political interests. Due to this development security has become an 
integrated part of the picture. The altered security image is affecting how civil-
military cooperation is viewed. One of the variables Ankersen (2008:3-4) uses 
when he is establishing if  civil-military cooperation is viewed as a „core 
activity‟, is to see if there is used considerable resources, time and effort on 
developing doctrines, guidelines and procedures.  Within NATO, Norway is 
playing an important role in the development of approaches concerning civil-
military cooperation and other approaches used in Afghanistan (NUPI 2009). At 
the national level, Norway‟s government has kept to the position that Norway as 
a NATO member follows NATO's doctrine on civil-military relations, so the 
work on developing a national approach has been put off. 
NATO‟s doctrine is first of all meant as a guideline to how military forces can 
meet other non-combat actors and the civil population (Rana 2008:230). CIMIC 
was thought to be a steppingstone toward even more integrated approaches. But 
concerns were raised by some NATO members and NGOs about the level of 
institutionalization it would result in has slowed down this process (DIIS report 
2008:30-31). The approach that NATO is trying to get through is called the 
„comprehensive approach‟.  This approach will work as a framework that will 
function in all phases, all the operational levels and involve all actors (DIIS 
report 2008). While the CIMIC doctrine has a greater focus on the military side 
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of the mission (Evne til innsats 2009). The focus by NATO to develop such an 
approach shows that on the multinational military level civil-military cooperation 
is viewed as a „core activity‟. 
The focus on a coherent approach in Afghanistan from the Norwegian political 
perspective has conceptualized the different actors as working side by side, but 
within clearly defined roles (White paper no.39 2003-2004). This fits well with 
the change the Norwegian military has gone through, from being mostly a 
homeland defense unit and occasionally operating as UN „citizen in uniform‟ to 
becoming increasingly connected to international operations through NATO, due 
to a heightening of military professionalism of the Norwegian military (NUPI 
2009). So when it comes to determining whether or not civil-military cooperation 
is viewed as a „core‟ or „side activity‟ by the Norwegian government, one can say 
that the government recognises the need for more cooperation proven by 
statements made by core political actors in the field of international relations, but 
they also want to have an approach that co-ordinates different actors working in 
complex conflicts. This is evident by Norway‟s active role at the international 
level. The progress made within the military should function well with the 
emphasis made on the preservation of the humanitarian space. In the Afghanistan 
context however a report made by NUPI (2008) state that;  
 “(…) Norway‟s identity has become more complex, because its military role (there) is 
undertaken as part of the NATO ISAF mission. Norway‟s military role in Afghanistan is a complex mix of 
a nationally identified PRT, an association with NATO that is emphasized at the operational level, and an 
association, at the strategic level, with the USA and the post-9/11 campaign against international 
terrorism. Norway has become prominently associated with NATO and the broader Western coalition and 
that erodes much of the small-state advantage it could otherwise have had in Afghanistan (NUPI 
2008:25). 
The fact that Norway is now linked to the Western coalition in Afghanistan will 
also affect how Norwegian NGOs get perceived in Afghanistan.   The role 
Norway plays in the armed operations in Afghanistan discussed earlier, and the 
fact that Norway‟s military effort stands without their own civil-military 
cooperation definition making  NATO‟s CIMIC „their‟ CIMIC (Bodding 2008) 
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will also affect the relationship between the humanitarian actors and the military 
actors. The value of civil-military cooperation for the military will be dependant 
on this. If one had to determine NATO‟s CIMIC as a „core‟ or „side‟ activity, it is 
evident that within NATO/ISAF operations CIMIC is a „core‟ activity. And since 
NATO‟s CIMIC, opens the door to a pragmatic approach towards civil-military 
cooperation to be used as a „core‟ or even as a „side‟ activity dependent on the 
situation at hand it will be difficult to maintain separate roles for the different 
actors.  
According to Cedric De Conning (2008:54) the contemporary form of civil-
military coordination is an attempt to systematically regulate the civil-military 
interface and Frangonikolopoulos (2005:51), takes it a step further and argues 
that it is a systematically way to  integrate  NGOs and humanitarian aid into the 
political sphere . The focus in integrating humanitarian aid and politics is gaining 
much support within the international multilateral governance regime and in the 
new branch of humanitarianism (HPG report 2001:9). The situation many NGOs 
working with humanitarian assistance are facing has furthered this discussion. 
The problem seems to be that there is some discrepancy between the different 
actors in their view on how much and what kind of cooperation is needed.  
The humanitarian body is not a homogenous group and stands divided when it 
comes to the perception of civil-military cooperation (Harang 2008).  The current 
discussions concerning the neutrality dilemma in humanitarian aid is leaving 
room for diverse views on cooperation with other actors. The humanitarian 
actors, who are supporting the traditional form of humanitarian aid, are concerned 
that open cooperation with the military may be hazardous for their security as 
well as their credibility with the local population. Another concern is that the new 
form of humanitarianism is open to founding humanitarian action on other 
criteria than the humanitarian principles. The followers of the new 
humanitarianism are arguing that more cooperation could also strengthen their 
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own role.  This way they can more easily control the role they are playing and 
voice their concerns.  
As this discussion illustrates many different perceptions on the meaning of civil 
military cooperation is circulating. These differences can be traced back to the 
diverse premises used in the definitions of civil-military cooperation presented in 
chapter 1.3.2. These premises can again be traced back to the different culture 
and structures that are between armed and unarmed actors. Each actor is basing 
their focal point on matters that are connected to their own interest, making it 
more than difficult to find common ground. The relationship between knowledge 
and reality of civil-military cooperation changes with each actor. Knowledge is 
developed through people‟s perceptions of the situation and is therefore a 
subject-object problem, which again will affect their actions.  Soldiers and 
humanitarian personnel will use different concepts and considerations when they 
reflect on the effects of cooperation, due to their different perception and 
experiences. 
6.2 The new security agenda and new roles for NGOs 
The security aspect of civil military cooperation is also a feature that is affecting 
the perspectives each actor has toward civil-military cooperation. At the political 
level this has lead to an extension of the “security agenda” (White paper no. 39 
2008-2009, Evne til innsats 2008).  The concept of national security has as 
explained in chapter 3.1.3 expanded and now human security and social security 
are inherent parts of the concept. This expanded vision also view failed states as 
potential risk factors, due to their inability to provide human and social security 
(White paper 13(2003-2004):60-62). As said, today‟s conflicts are often intra-
states conflicts and they are meant to be more comprehensive because they often  
consist of non-state entities that fight for different reasons like ethnical conflicts, 
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power, independence, resources or religious beliefs (Knight 2008:15). These 
types of conflicts have a high possibility for creating humanitarian crises and 
complex conflicts where traditional humanitarian often falls short (HPG report 
2001:5).  
All of the issues said above is leading to a merging of aid and politics and the 
view that these problems must be dealt with by comprehensive approaches where 
several actors cooperate.The three fields concerning relief, development and 
security has as a result of the merging processes between aid and politics  grown  
closer together and now play an interlinked role. Goodhand (2008:78) illustrates 
this development as three overlapping circles (figure 1). 
Figure 1. The relationship between relief,development and security 
 
 
Development 
 
Security Relief 
Figure 1 the relationship between relief, development and security 
63 
 
The wide political agreement in Norway to use NGOs as channels in 
humanitarian and developmental work is making humanitarian actors fear that 
they may be used, or perceived, as political instruments due to the growing 
overlapping of development, security and relief (Lie 2006:143) as shown in the 
figure above. The expansion of the security agenda has therefore resulted in a 
new debate within the humanitarian body, not only in Norway, but amongst all 
NGOs working with humanitarian assistance. One of the main topics being how 
the promotion of integrated approaches may affect the integrity of humanitarian 
principles, humanitarian assistance and what consequences it will have for their 
security on the field (HPG report 2006). 
This makes the separation between why and how especially important in complex 
conflicts, where both military and NGOs need to relate to large scale strategy 
plans and having different roles to fulfill. The „blurring‟ of these roles have lead 
to an increase in concerns surrounding the security for NGOs working in complex 
conflict situations. This has fostered different views on how it‟s best to respond 
to this issue. New humanitarianism advocates that security links NGOs and the 
military so that the political objectives for closer coordination and cooperation 
are the next natural steps to gain security (Fox 2001).  While NGOs that are based 
on the traditional principles feel that the humanitarian principles should be the 
guidelines to better security for NGOs. They also argue that being closely 
associated with international military forces could jeopardize the humanitarian 
space (Jenny 2001:28).   
While White paper no.13 (2008-09):67) from the Ministry of Environment and 
Development recognises that in complex conflict situations, security is connected 
to having clearly defined roles, it also recognises that the deteriorating security 
level has made it unsafe for NGOs to work in some areas. Many NGOs are 
therefore relying on military support in form of armed protection. It is mostly 
seen as a “last resort” to use armed convoys, not only since it would be going 
64 
 
against humanitarian principles but it would also give the military a double role. 
While protecting NGOs they often have to perform tasks related to humanitarian 
work while being armed and representing one side of the conflict (Harang 2008).  
In this patchwork of operational environments humanitarian actors who stand 
without armed forces for protection can easily become „soft‟ targets. The ECHO 
report (2004:20-25) states that while there have been some reports of attacks 
against humanitarian aid workers, it is not enough to confirm whether or not 
humanitarian work is becoming more dangerous. However, what is more evident 
is that security incidents of a more serious nature than before seem to be 
increasing. There is also a correlation between when and where the different 
attacks occur:  
 “In various contexts, new threats have emerged during the so called „war on terror‟. For 
example, four recent shooting incidents in Somaliland – a previously stable context – were attributed to 
Islamic extremists targeting Westerners. Following recent security incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
Mullah Omar‟s statement of October 2003 that Western humanitarian organizations were the "worst 
enemies of Islam", terrorist violence against humanitarian personnel is a real possibility in many parts of 
the world”(ECHO 2004:21).  
 
The promotion of more integrated approaches and the link between armed forces 
and Norwegian NGOs gives Norway a more complex role as described by Cedric 
de Coning et al. (2008:25). It is all having an effect on the capacity of NGOs to 
maintain their neutrality in the field, hence their security.  Being faced with the 
prospect of losing their neutrality has sparked different reactions.  Several NGOs, 
like MSF are now working in areas in Afghanistan where there is little 
connection between them and military forces. They are also refusing to use or 
receive state donations for their work. More organisations are engaging in 
platform discussions with other actors to influence the directions the political 
actors in Norway are making. One platform for this is the Afghan forum that is 
functioning as a pipeline between NGOs and the Norwegian government (NUPI 
2009). 
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This shows that there are large challenges when it comes to the politics, policy 
and practice regarding the security concerns for people working in post-conflict 
zones. While the politics are clear on what the goals for Norway‟s involvement in 
Afghanistan are, there are still some difficulties when it comes to what type of 
practise one should follow. NGOs and the humanitarian regime is facing a 
transformation where the new humanitarian  approach is trying to bridge the gaps 
between the different camps by abandoning some of the core principles 
embedded in humanitarian aid and arguing that they are absolute in today‟s 
conflict picture. The last chapter will discuss how NGOs in the Norwegian 
system are handling these changes. Are their close ties to the Norwegian 
government hindering NGOs to speak out towards this new trend or is the model 
helping NGOs keeping the status quo? 
6.3 Concluding remarks: How are Norwegian NGOs 
handling changes? 
The civil-military debate and the situation in Afghanistan is challenging because 
in the Norwegian context this is fairly new. The role Norway has presumed in 
Afghanistan has been somewhat of a hybrid between a small country focused on 
humanitarian assistance and a country with a highly professionalised military unit 
that are rewarded by their accomplishments in war (Bakkeli 2007).  The 
integration process that Norwegian NGOs have been through has made the 
Norwegian case somewhat unique.  Norwegian NGOs are too close and to far 
apart at the same time. Too close so that they are easily linked to Norwegian 
political interests, making it difficult to maintain a neutral profile and to find a 
way through their lack of political engagement to affect the current situation. Or 
are they? 
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According to the HPG report 2001 
“The tendency towards using political criteria to determine the allocation 
of humanitarian assistance was constrained to some extent by appeal to 
the conventional principles of humanitarian action: neutrality and 
impartiality. These principles reflected a shared understanding between 
humanitarian organizations, politicians and the military (…)” (HPG 
report 2001:9) 
 
In the Norwegian context it is likely that the relationship between Norwegian 
NGOs and the Norwegian government also is a determining factor.  As shown the 
Norwegian government has been very vocal about the importance of the 
humanitarian space and it is only the ministry of defence that has advocated for a 
pragmatic use of military forces. Norway has also been an active participant in 
NATO for developing NATO doctrines as well as guidelines for humanitarian 
actors at the international level, but has not followed this engagement up at the 
national level. This could be due to the standing Norwegian NGOs have in the 
Norwegian model. As the outcome of civil military cooperation still is under 
development most of the discussion around civil-military cooperation is based on 
assumptions, but what is evident is that there is a change in the sails. The 
cooperation focus is slowly becoming integrated into the Norwegian model. The 
use of NGOs as apolitical partners is becoming more difficult because the 
Norwegian system is not operating in a vacuum. While this is a relatively new 
aspect of Norwegian aid this has developed into international strategies for other 
countries and through Norway‟s NATO membership Norway and the Norwegian 
model stands to be perceived in the same way. How this is being debated within 
the humanitarian body will follow in the next chapter. 
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7. The humanitarian debate  
This chapter will give an overview of the humanitarian debate and connect it to 
the situation Norwegian NGOs are faced with. So far much of the debate in this 
thesis has been centred on the changes happening around the NGOs and how 
these changes are affecting the context around them. This chapter will look at the 
debate within the humanitarian body and how this debate is changing 
humanitarian assistance. The tools from Hirschman‟s theory that NGOs have to 
influence the system around them will also be discussed. 
7.1 Introduction 
There are some key trends that are making commotion in the debate of preserving 
humanitarian principles and the humanitarian space. One side is the mounting 
debate about humanitarian assistance needing to become more politically 
sensitive due to the nature of today‟s conflicts. This view supports an 
increasingly coherent approach under „new humanitarianism‟ and it is mirrored 
by the cooperation focus held by the government and military (HPG report 2001).  
The counterview is that by keeping with the traditional-based humanitarian 
principles the humanitarian imperative is preserved and NGOs will be able to 
work in highly sensitive conflicts due to their independence and neutral profile. 
The Norwegian model has strong roots within traditional-based aid. This is also 
the reason for their strong role in the Norwegian model; their neutral profile has 
so far made it possible for them to work in areas the Norwegian government has 
had to stay clear of. The shift towards more comprehensive models where all 
actors work together stands to alter this system (NUPI 2009). 
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7.2 The security debate 
There has been an increase in concerns surrounding the security for NGOs 
working in complex conflict situations. This has fostered different views on how 
to best respond to the issue. New humanitarianism advocates that there is a link 
between NGOs, military efforts and political objectives where closer 
coordination and cooperation are natural steps on the way to achieve security 
(Fox 2001).   NGOs that are based on the traditional humanitarian body view the 
core humanitarian principles as the best way to ensure their security in the field. 
They also argue that being closely associated with international military forces 
could jeopardize the humanitarian space (Jenny 2001, Morris 2002).    
Today Afghanistan is called the most dangerous place for NGOs (Olson 
2006:11). The yearbook for „global civil society‟ shows an increase of nearly 
1300% in attacks on NGOs working in Afghanistan from 1990-2005 (p.432)
46
. 
The security issues in Afghanistan are creating “no go” areas. Blurring of roles is 
meant to be connected to the development projects preformed by military or non 
humanitarian actors.  This has led some NGOs to stay more or less based in 
secure places like Kabul (Braem 2008). When NGOs don‟t spread out it can lead 
to little redistribution of assistance which again may lead to more insecurity.  
The Norwegian political perspective on how best to respond to the security issues 
shows an understanding for the connection between development and aid. Both 
White paper no. 13 (2008-2009) and White paper no. 15 (2008-2009) holds the 
position that the government supports the notion of „no security without 
development, and no development without security‟. White paper no.15 (2008-
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 Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics. “Terrorist Incidents targeting NGOs: 
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2009) also links the security debate to a global level by stating that “Norway has 
a responsibility to engage itself with what happens “out there” because of the 
long-term consequences it may have for  Norway in the future” (White paper no. 
15 2008-2009):103). 
In Afghanistan there have been three main operational issues that have been 
prioritized by the international community, stability, development and good 
governance. Stability has been connected to the international military‟s mandate 
while development, in part has been linked to the work of NGOs (Bodding 2008: 
37). Some NGOs are willing to coordinate with military forces and see them as 
playing a vital role in their own security  (Gourly 2000:38), but most want to keep 
this coordination at an information sharing level concerning combat zones and 
other security issues (Jenny 2001:25). The roles of the international military 
forces in Afghanistan held by NGOs are linked to restoring order, armed combat 
and maintaining post-conflict peace. If they involve themselves in other aspects it 
is often criticized as “blurring of roles” PRTs and the PRT have received 
especially criticism as they through their focus on reconstruction often undertake 
many of the activities mainly performed by NGOs (Olsen 2006:14).  
Through my interviews with representatives from Medecins Sans Frontieres and 
Red Cross the main view I could gather on the security issue was that when 
working in a complex conflict situation, like the one in Afghanistan, being 
understood as neutral and independent and working out of  humanity and not 
other agendas was seen as the most important way to preserve security and the 
humanitarian space. To achieve this the guidelines and the humanitarian 
principles must be followed and respected by all actors.  The issue of „blurring of 
roles‟ seemed to be the main concern, when it came to issues where their security 
and perception of them was disturbed.  The link between security and 
development was not raised much and it appers that  non of the NGOs sees 
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cooperation with military actors as a means to more security. Their security was 
more connected to their own plans and restrictions. 
Another issue affecting the NGOs working in Afghanistan is their financial 
situation. Many Norwegian organisations in Afghanistan are financially 
dependent on the Norwegian state and that could be a factor that limits the 
organisation‟s decision-making ability. It also has an effect on their independence 
profile; most of them receive large donations from the state. Peter Rehse (2004) 
makes a point of this when he talks about the value of being independent for 
humanitarian organisations. 
“Being dependent, especially financially dependent, could limit the organization‟s decision-
making ability, since a financial associate could try to gain control or intrude into the organization‟s 
politics by exercising financial pressure. The fact that the work of humanitarian agencies depends mainly 
on donations makes the conditions difficult” (Rehese 2004:20-21). 
 
So the issue of independence becomes highly relevant when one looks at the 
context around the organisations. Afghanistan was not a country that got 
prioritised in the Norwegian aid budget before 2001 and now Afghanistan is one 
of Norway‟s largest receivers of Norwegian aid, both through state – state aid and 
also bilateral aid channelled through organisations
47
. Now, there is a political 
focus on more cooperation and a more holistic approach. The level of 
independence may be affected. Organisations that work with humanitarian 
assistance should be able to follow their own values, principles and ideas. 
Norwegian organisations, in general, are in a dependent relationship when it 
comes to financial support, even though there is no 1-1 relationship between 
autonomy and finance; it is more than likely to have an impact. When it comes to 
the situation for the Norwegian NGOs this has developed over a long period of 
time and that will affect their autonomy. The individual share, that each 
organization has to pay, shrunk from 50% of their total budget to 10 % in 2001 
                                              
47 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/bistand_afghanistan/bistand.html?id=573478 
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(Groth 1999, Tvedt 2003, Lie 2006). The individual share symbolized that the 
organizations represent the civil society and not the state‟s interest. Today, most 
organizations don‟t need to contribute any share at all when entering into a 
project, since there are constantly more and more grants provided to cover the 
expenses the organization gets. This is in contrast to the principle that all 
humanitarian assistance should be led without political strings attached.  
7.3 Humanitarian assistance 
“Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives 
and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in 
accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.” (UN-
OCHA pamphlet 2006
48
) 
 
Humanitarian assistance has as an objective to alleviate human suffering and is 
not supposed to engage in political objectives nor make distinctions between 
victims. This point is currently under debate. First of all due to the fact that aid is 
not impact-free and there seems to be a growing perception that traditional 
humanitarian action is failing. The argument is that the traditional approach has 
problems dealing with the altered conditions of today‟s conflicts (Frereks 2006, 
Slim 1997).  
Even though the objective of humanitarian assistance is to stay neutral, 
humanitarian assistance has always been influenced to some degree by political 
activity. Nevertheless, NGOs try to ensure that their main principles, humanity, 
neutrality, independence and impartiality are respected. One of the main reasons 
is that these principles sustain the humanitarian space, which NGOs depend on 
when working in the field. This was confirmed by both NGO informants that 
                                              
48 http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=291  
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were interviewed for this thesis
49
. Nonetheless, it has been a shift in the contexts 
surrounding humanitarian assistance and aid. One where humanitarian assistance 
and aid appears to be linked to wider political objectives, such as the security 
agenda presented in chapter 6.2. The focus on more coordination, cooperation, 
comprehensive and integral approaches appears to be part of the political answer 
to face complex conflicts. This has led to a change in the role of NGOs and 
humanitarianism.  
The role of NGOs are changing from being situated outside the foreign political 
sphere, they now play an important role in how resources used in Norwegian 
foreign affairs are distributed. So even though the Norwegian aid system is built 
on traditional humanitarian values some features from the new humanitarian 
approach is making its mark. While the traditional approach is based on the linear 
progression of aid, first emergency humanitarian assistance; secondly transition 
aid and thirdly long-term development programs. In complex conflicts all of these 
stages are put into motion at more or less the same time which is also 
contributing to blurring of roles by the NGOs themselves. Since it is difficult to 
know the motivation from all the different NGOs, and to know what all the 
different actors on the ground are doing (Stene 2005:56-57).  It is also difficult to 
make distinctions based on the word humanitarian. 
While humanitarian aid is supposed to be a short term assistance project, they are 
now prolonged by the ongoing need for basic assistance. This way the line 
between humanitarian assistance and development aid are in many cases erased.  
The policy connected to aid is therefore also changing, and this has consequences 
for those receiving it, in this case the Afghan people.  It is therefore important to 
separate between the reasons for why and how aid is used. The new humanitarian 
                                              
49 Interviews on 27/2-09 and 16/1-09 
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approach advocates for a more politically sensitive approach that recognises that 
there are connections between NGOs, politics and military efforts.  
There has been a paradigm change in the security-political landscape and the use 
of humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping operations and civil-military 
cooperation has all lead to new challenges (Jackson&Sørensen 2003). This has 
also affected the use of aid and given it an instrumental value as a “stabiliser 
tool”. While there is a larger political focus on achieving a more comprehensive 
approach towards peace and rebuilding Afghanistan, the involved actors have 
different opinions on how this should be done. There are two actors in particular 
that needs to be studied and that is the role of military and that of the NGOs. 
The core distinction between NGOs that work with humanitarian assistance and 
the military can be found in the means and the goals of their work. While the 
NGOs focus on aid founded on humanitarian criteria; humanity, neutrality and 
non-discrimination the military thinks of this as a secondary criterion. A large 
part of the debate is centralised around the question of „humanitarian space‟. It is 
defined by the European commission as” the access and freedom for 
humanitarian organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs” (ECHO 
report 2004:71). 
The traditional perspective is concerned that pollicisation of aid will make aid 
into a tool to ensure the donor country‟s own political agenda. And that the 
problems concerning the promiscuity of the military and humanitarian aid 
workers‟ roles in the field are being downplayed. The notion that civilian-military 
co-operated operations gets portrayed and understood as an agreed goal is a large 
part of the debate and there is a general concern that principles, goals and 
methodologies for working in the field are different and often clash in 
Afghanistan (Harang 2008 & Olson and Gregorian 2007). There is also a general 
concern that developments strategies build on military strategies are at risk for 
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having too little understanding of the socio-cultural aspects and are more focused 
on legitimating the external military presence, rather than tending to the Afghan 
people‟s needs.   
The opposite perception is that civil-military coordination is necessary in today‟s 
world and that external military intervention have an important role in restoring 
order, maintaining peace, and preventing mobilisation from militant groups in the 
stabilisation and rebuilding phase (Collier 2007:124-125,). While many now are 
optimistic towards this trend and agree on the fact that it is almost impossible to 
separate military and humanitarian roles in the field, they argue that there are 
guidelines that the military and humanitarian aid workers are following. The 
general meaning seems to be that they all should focus on pulling in the same 
direction rather than holding on to notions like apolitical aid. The Norwegian 
government states in White paper no .22 (2008-2009:71-75); 
 “[T]hat further work on improving guidelines, too better the information 
flow and improving the civil-military coordinated work is crucial” It also states 
“that civil-military coordinated work not merely is the best way to work in 
conflict areas, it is the only way
50”  
This shows the two main challenges around coordination in complex conflict 
situations. While the government and military seem to mean that there is a valid 
need for more co-operation and integrated approaches towards complex conflicts, 
the humanitarian circle seems to be sceptical and have a general concern towards 
this way of working. This thesis will examine closer these perceptions and how it 
is affecting the relationship between the Norwegian government and NGOs.  
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 writers own translation and emphasize 
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7.4 The Norwegian humanitarian mission statement 
Norwegian humanitarian engagement is a part of Norwegian foreign and 
development policy .Norwegian humanitarian assistance and aid is built on 
humanitarian principles that are recognised by the UN and international 
humanitarian law. It is also based on need and requirement estimations. Even 
though Norwegian aid and humanitarian assistance is built on these principles 
and guidelines, several Norwegian NGOs have stated that the underlying 
principles for providing assistance have changed. They have reported that it is 
unclear what strategic priorities humanitarian aid is being based on and that this 
makes it unclear what role they play. Further it has been reported that this makes 
it difficult to implement and follow political guidelines and turning them into 
concrete actions (Riksrevesjonen 2.3 2008:9). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has contradicted these statements and argued that their strategic priorities are 
clear, but that they need to be flexible due to unforeseen changes (Riksrevisjonen 
2.3 2008:9).  The need for flexibility is important when one is working in 
complex conflicts since the situation can change rapidly.  
The Norwegian humanitarian mission statement (2008) shows that there are 
narrow margins between the political objective and humanitarian action. In the 
statement it is claimed that “Norway wants to be a leading partner both 
politically and financially in humanitarian effort, and aid the international 
society to best meet the future challenges”, then it goes on to say that “There is a 
common understanding within the Norwegian government alongside 
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humanitarian groups that this can best be obtained by humanitarian principles 
and with civilian leadership” (Humanitære strategier 2008:9)51. 
However, not all parties of the government support the idea that this should be 
done by humanitarian principles and civilian leadership alone. While the MFA 
support the humanitarian imperative (within certain boundaries) the Ministry of 
Defence (MD)  and several politicians have on several occasions talked about the 
need to focus more on cooperation and integration in  part of constructing a more 
comprehensive approach 
52
 . 
The Norwegian government recognizes with the document “humanitarian 
strategy report” (2008) the need for viewing humanitarian assistance as apolitical 
and validates the concerns about the issue of military forces doing humanitarian 
work. But they also emphasize that in some cases due to security issues military 
actors have to engage in humanitarian work. Some NGOs see this as a 
problematic stand, because it also signifies that the government puts security 
assessments as bases for delivery of humanitarian assistance and not need and 
requirement. The fear is that this will become the standard and not the exception. 
One example is in the UK security assessments which have a direct effect on 
NGOs working in Afghanistan. The government ruled that because of the 
security concerns any NGO sending expatriates to Afghanistan would 
automatically lose their funding from the Department for International 
Development (DFID). This restrictions was linked to a wider political objective 
developed by the US and UK as a way to isolate Taliban (HPG report 2001:9). So 
                                              
51
 from the department of foreign affairs “Humanitære strategier 2008” available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2008/hum_strategi.html?id=526419 
52 This was argued by Ine Eriksen Søreide, leader of utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen in an extra ordinary meeting at the 
Norwegian parliament (TV2 nyheter onsdag 20/12-09). 
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what does all of this have to say for Norwegian humanitarian assistance and 
NGOs?  
First of all, it confirms that there is a marginal process between the political 
sphere and the humanitarian regime. Secondly, the link to security has also ties to 
policies in donor countries, in the Norwegian context there has been an increase 
in funds channeled to one particular province in Afghanistan, Faryab, which is 
the same region that most of Norway‟s civil and military effort is situated. One 
explanation for gathering the Norwegian resources like this is because one wants 
to increase the efficiency of Norwegian effort, but this has also led to questions 
concerning the level of independence. The level of funding is a result of the 
international response to the crisis following 11
th
 September 2001; it may also be 
understood as an economical integration process since this is a trend that has a 
long history in Norway. With altered conditions it appears that this may affect the 
overall aims of humanitarian assistance. 
7.5 Traditional vs. New humanitarism 
According to Shannon (2009:16-17) who, where and what aid is sent out is 
increasingly constrained by conditions on the ground. So, the  civil-military 
cooperation approach and the security issues facing humanitarian aid workers in 
Afghanistan is not just  having an impact on how NGOs work, but also the 
overall aims of humanitarian assistance. The security constraints are affecting the 
NGOs possibility to freely move around. They have reported that they are closing 
or not starting programs, staying in Kabul and working under strict safety 
guidelines (ibid.:23-24).  This is leading aid away from areas where it is needed 
and it is reducing contact and making “no go-areas” where only military actors 
venture. The security restrains put on the NGOs due to the situation is also having 
an impact on the military actors. Many feel that they need to reach out to the 
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communities that the NGOs are not travelling to as expressed by the former 
Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Bård Glad Pedersen in chapter 1.  
The paradigm shift in the security-political landscape and the use of humanitarian 
interventions, peacekeeping operations and civil-military cooperation have all led 
to these new changes (Jackson&Sørensen 2003). This has also affected the use of 
aid and given it an instrumental value as a “stabilising tool”. While there is a 
larger political focus on achieving a more comprehensive approach towards 
peace and rebuilding Afghanistan, the involved actors have different opinions on 
how this should be done. The way Norwegian NGOs respond to the current 
changes may affect what role Norwegian NGOs will play in the future, when 
responding to complex conflicts.  
 
Figure 2 Different influences on Norwegian NGOs in Afghanistan 
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As figure 2 shows Norwegian NGOs are being influenced by different actors and 
circumstances in Afghanistan.  The context around them is frequently changing 
and the humanitarian debate provides two distinctive ways to respond to the 
altered conditions.  One way is to stay true to the core principles and use the 
principles of need as a way of conduct or one can fallow the new branch of 
humanitarian aid and follow a new trend within humanitarian assistance (HPG 
2001)  
The core distinction between NGOs that work with humanitarian assistance based 
on traditional humanitarianism and those basing their work on the principles of 
new humanitarianism are both the means and the goals of their work. While 
traditional-based NGOs focus on aid founded on the humanitarian criterions; 
humanity, neutrality and non-discrimination as a way to gain access, the new 
humanitarian‟s advocates for a more political forward form of aid. They view the 
neutrality principle as expired which marks a break from the past. By taking back 
the political side of aid and re-legitimising it, they are sending a message that 
neutral aid is a thing of the past (Fox 2001: 275, Slim 1997). The new 
humanitarian approach is a product of today‟s political environment and today‟s 
complex conflicts. It offers new political-based solutions that also want to 
alleviate suffering, but not at any cost. They view their integrity as a vital part of 
their profile, emergency assistance is not viewed as sufficient, one also needs to 
advocate for issues like human rights, democracy and goal-oriented assistance. It 
opens the door for NGOs to voice their concerns and act if what they are 
reporting is not being taken into account by the politicians.  
Neutrality is at the heart of the traditional form of humanitarian aid.  In order to 
gain the confidence of all parties in a conflict and maintain the humanitarian 
space one should stay neutral. The traditional perspective is concerned that if 
NGOs become to voice active it will lead to a pollicisation of aid. And that will 
make aid into a tool to ensure the donor country‟s own political agenda (Slim 
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1997). One area that has been debated is that the promiscuity of the military and 
humanitarian aid workers roles in the field will be downplayed as a result of that. 
The notion that civilian-military co-operated operations gets portrayed and 
understood as an agreed goal is a large part of the debate (HPG 2001). 
The new humanitarianism and the traditional form of humanitarian aid have two 
different outlooks on how to deal with these issues. While the traditional form of 
humanitarian assistance aid is advocating a stricter use of the humanitarian 
principles as guidelines for all humanitarian assistance, they are especially 
concerned about the perception of NGOs and their security if military forces or 
hybrids like the PRT are filling in the gaps between military and civilian efforts 
(Shannon 2009) and the diminishing humanitarian space. The blurring of roles 
and security triangle, built on acceptance, protection and determines the 
conceptual basis for traditional humanitarian NGOs as their main choice as 
operational security. 
 
By analysing and discussing these two positions against each other using the 
three positions of response used in Hirschman‟s theory one can examine what 
form of impact the political shift toward more cooperation may have on the 
relationship between Norwegian NGOs and Norwegian government and further 
discuss how their security concerns and civil military cooperation approach may 
affect their ability to stay neutral in the field.  
7.5.1 Hirschman and humanitarian aid 
In the research done in this thesis I did two interviews, one with a representative 
from the MSF and one with a representative from the Red Cross. They provided 
two different takes on how NGOs are seeing and understanding the shift in 
Norwegian policy when it comes to civil-military cooperation and the 
humanitarian debate surrounding this. Both Red Cross and MSF have voiced 
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criticism towards blurring of roles, but only MSF have actively criticized the use 
of humanitarian assistance as a means to an end in the war in Afghanistan (Rana 
2008). 
Both of these organizations are internationally based organizations (INGO), but 
they get funding from Norway and they are facing many of the same questions 
raised in this thesis so they will be used in the following debate. But as they are 
two large international organizations that are not financially dependent on 
funding from the Norwegian government like many small Norwegian 
organizations are. So the way they are handling donor interest connected to 
funding will not be considered representative for the Norwegian model. 
As argued for in chapter 6, there has been a convergence between three different 
areas; relief, development and security. This has led to a broadening of the scope 
of NGOs involvement and they need to re-negotiate their relationship to the 
government and military. In Albert O. Hirschman (1970) study of consumer 
behavior he explores how consumers react in the face of deteriorating quality of 
goods. NGOs can either exit their relationship or they can voice their concerns on 
how the use of aid as a political instrument will affect their work and the aim 
with humanitarian assistance. Exit and voice can both lead to norm changes and 
new perceptions on the interaction between the state and NGOs. There is 
however the interplay of loyalty which can affect the way NGOs chooses to 
respond to this trend. Loyalty is understood as keeping quiet and leaving things as 
they are. By understanding this mechanism one can start to better understand 
what the effects of civil-military cooperation may have for the relationship 
between the Norwegian government and that of the NGOs. 
The broadening of humanitarian action has put pressure on each NGO on how 
they should engage within international or domestic political realm (Goodhand 
2006:187).  The Red Cross has a strict relationship to their core principles. It may 
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not take sides in any types of conflicts and does not engage in political, racial or 
religious nature (Fox 2001:227). The way Red Cross is working in Afghanistan is 
through a partnership with the Afghan led Red Crescent Movement and they have 
focused their work on humanitarian issues, within the humanitarian space. They 
are not voicing any criticism toward any side of the conflict making them one of 
the few NGO in Afghanistan working in Taliban-controlled areas. 
By keeping close to the traditional humanitarian principles they are achieving 
access to all parties in the conflict. One of the major concerns when it comes to 
the issue of civil-military cooperation has been the issue of „blurring of roles‟. 
The Red Cross has had little problems in Afghanistan with this due to the fact 
that they hold a low profile in Afghanistan. They do not involve themselves with 
state building nor with the good governance focus made by political actors.  They 
stay neutral due to the fact that in Afghanistan the military actors, NATO and the 
National Guard and police, are connected to the government and to political 
alliances. The Red Cross does not see it as their role to involve themselves in the 
developmental features of the mission in Afghanistan. Other reasons for them not 
to involve themselves is the fact that in Afghanistan Taliban the group NATO is 
fighting actually is one of the authoritarian figures. The traditional form of 
humanitarian aid does not hinder NGOs in working with development aid, but 
because of the complex situation in Afghanistan the Red Cross is careful not to 
involve themselves in this part of the mission.
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The Red Cross refusal to engage in political sensitive issues and to stay neutral in 
any case, is in contrast to how MSF work. Their focus has been in the principle of 
impartiality, and combines this with voicing their concerns (Goodhand 2006:187-
188).  The MSF view the ability to use voice actively as a way to maintain their 
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independence. Another way they maintain their independence is by keeping 
government funding low. 
The security issue has been one of the main focal points for NGOs when it comes 
to more coordination.  In 2004 MSF left Afghanistan due to an attack that led to 
the death of several MSF workers. There is still some uncertainty around why the 
MSF was attacked, and if it was intentional. The security aspect of NGOs is 
closely connected to their ability to maintain their humanitarian space. When 
MSF was attacked they meant that the context around them and how 
humanitarian assistance was functioning in Afghanistan was unsatisfying, due to 
diminishing humanitarian space
54
. 
The MSF used the exit position after the attack in 2004 and did not venture back 
before 2009 when they thought they could maintain an independent role in 
Afghanistan. They are keeping to the impartiality principle that allows them to 
voice any concerns if they feel that they are losing their humanitarian space. They 
are also working without government funding and only use private donations to 
fund their work in Afghanistan to ensure their independence
55
. 
One of the criticisms towards the new humanitarianism is that without the neutral 
principle they can in complex conflicts become too critical and lose their 
humanitarian space due to their own outspokenness.  Although, those who 
supports the new humanitarian approach accept that speaking out carries a risk, 
they argue that this is the price for getting the attention they need (Fox 2001:282). 
Hirschman‟s three ways of responding gives the two organisations the same 
options, but due to their different views on what is the best way to keep their 
integrity. They base their choices on different foundations. While the MSF is 
                                              
54 Interview  16.01.09 Oslo 
55 http://www.legerutengrenser.no/Aktuelt/Artikler/Tilbake-i-Afghanistan 
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choosing to be an „active voicing NGO‟, in order to keep their independence the 
Red Cross is choosing to do the opposite. Both gain their objectives in the 
process. The fact that they are two major NGOs staying financially independent 
and where one, the Red Cross has the responsibility to implement the Geneva 
Convention is having an impact on how they can use two so different approaches 
and still keep their humanitarian space. 
For smaller NGOs the situation will most likely be different. While one can 
advocate that today‟s conflicts need the new humanitarianism, the fact that Red 
Cross has access to almost every type of conflict and to both sides can not be 
disregarded.  So is new humanitarianism the answer? While organisations like the 
MSF have been in the forefront advocating for a more political role, there seems 
to be a limitation to which organisations that can do this. Large organisations like 
the MSF can clearly handle the realm that follows unpopular statements. Smaller 
NGOs wanting to follow in their footprints can easily be forced into aid 
paradigms that are based on other political agendas than their own, resulting in 
becoming part of the problem and not the solution. 
7.6 Concluding remarks  
The debate between traditional and new humanitarianism is challenging 
humanitarian principles as the main way to conduct humanitarian assistance and 
as the best way to stay secure. The debate is also questioning the traditional 
humanitarian approach‟s capability to respond to the altered conditions 
surrounding today‟s conflicts. 
The traditional way is supported by most Norwegian NGOs while the Norwegian 
government and military seem to be more interested in the new humanitarian 
86 
 
view; the humanitarian equivalent of the cooperation strategy presented by the 
military. This also seems to be the base for the main differences between them. 
The security issue appears to be the key issue that concerns the humanitarian 
body, independent of which way they see it resolved.  Another key issue is the 
reasons behind assistance and intervention. The view that security measurements 
may influence who delivers are highly debated. The humanitarian principles 
appear to be the leading principles Norwegian NGOs want to use when trying to 
ensure their security when working in conflict zones.  
As the Norwegian NGOs grow more and more dependent on government funding 
their autonomous role will be affected. The years with little or no conditions 
connected to funding have gradually changed and now NGOs need to show result 
and efficiency (Lorentzen 1994).  Few agencies except Red Cross and MSF, who 
receive large private donations, can afford to withstand donations from the state. 
The financial dependency, economical integration and the normative integration 
process of the organizations have brought back the question of independency. 
The dependency on donations can in the long run pressure them to make a choice. 
They can either choose to continue to receive large funds, while advocating for 
independency and apolitical aid, or reduce their activities. 
The focus on civil-military cooperation and coherence is furthered due too the 
wider political focus on aid and what role aid might play in the re-building of 
failed states. However the asymmetrical relationship between the Norwegian 
government, military and NGOs will not be beneficiary for the NGOs. Therefore 
the interplay of loyalty might play a more important feature when NGOs decides 
on what role they will play in the future. While the military is benefiting on being 
loyal „state servants‟, NGOs have diffuse allegiances and other principles that 
lead their actions. Building on their relationship as development partner the civil-
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military cooperation approach will not strengthen their independence, but it might 
weaken it and lead them to become more biased than they initially bargained for. 
So to sum up, the Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) and Red Cross responded to 
the shift in politics and the focus from NATO to form more coordination between 
NGOs and themselves in different ways. Similar to Hirschman‟s exit and voice 
strategies. MSF exited their working arrangements in Afghanistan primarily due 
to the worsening of the security situation and the diminishing humanitarian space. 
They clearly voiced their concerns of what civil-military cooperation approaches 
like NATO's CIMIC and all kind of interrelation with military forces may have 
on humanitarian assistance. MSF has now, since 2009, returned to Afghanistan, 
but is not using state resources in their work.
56
 
 Red Cross has on the other hand found ways to remain in Afghanistan and keep 
their humanitarian space, mainly by keeping to strict neutrality and impartiality 
principles; under the interviews there was by very different means they responded 
to the effects of this trend. There could be several reasons for why my 
respondents had so different perceptions. It could be their international 
connections to umbrella organisations or it could be that they have adapted 
different roles in the aid and humanitarian assistance society due to different 
historical bases. The Red Cross foundation is connected to the Geneva 
Convention and MSF was founded in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis in 
Biafra and basing their work on the Témoignage-principle, meaning that in 
contrast to the ICRCs the MSF will speak out in public when faced with mass 
violations of human rights.
57
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This discussion shows that there is no single answer on how NGOs should 
respond to a diminishing humanitarian space. It does however weaken the 
argument made by the new humanitarians; that staying neutral is not functioning 
in today‟s conflicts. As one can see it is most likely Red Cross‟s profile as neutral 
actors that are gaining them access in Afghanistan and to people in other conflict 
areas. 
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8. Conclusion 
I started this thesis with a rowing metaphor found in an article written for the 
”Journal of Military and Strategic Studies” as that metaphor illustrated how 
there is little common ground within or between the different actors on how they 
can work together and get the boat in the direction that they want to go.   
The question that I asked was if this new approach based on cooperation between 
the different actors would influence the Norwegian model and Norwegian 
humanitarian aid as it was evident that in complex conflicts, like the one in 
Afghanistan the different actor may need to work together in new ways.  Based 
on this and the political shift towards more co-operative approaches, I then made 
the hypothesis that; “The NGOs and the Norwegian government are at odds, 
because they have different perceptions of how civilian-military operations of 
NATO will impact Norwegian humanitarian assistance”. To study the 
perspectives kept by the Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs and the 
new third party the Norwegian military I made 4 sub questions. Throughout this 
thesis I have tried to answer these questions and discuss the different aspect of 
what I have found. 
8.1  Summary  
So is the Norwegian model being influenced by the introduction of a third party, 
the military? And if so how is this affecting humanitarian aid? There seems to be 
several answers to this, a short recap will sum up the main points found in this 
thesis.  
From the Norwegian model the fact that Norwegian NGOs have a solid 
foundation outside the political sphere was established, because they were more 
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or less developed outside of the political sphere first (Groth 1999, Tvedt 2003). 
Many have over the years grown to be financially dependent of the state due to 
the massive funding they get. Funding and normative integration is turning 
Norwegian NGOs into development partners, making it difficult to claim that 
they are independent actors.  However Norway‟s small country profile has made 
it easier for NGOs to have a close relationship with the Norwegian government 
and still claim that they are neutral.  
The main focus with the Norwegian model has been that the working 
relationships between the state and NGOs have been based on a sense of 
consensus on what humanitarian action should be based on. The current political 
shift stands to have an affect on this, and Norwegian NGOs and the state are not 
agreeing on the impact civil military cooperation will have on humanitarian 
assistance.  The fear for many NGOs is that by cooperating with armed forces 
they themselves may be seen as working for one side of the conflict, thereby 
losing the humanitarian space they need to operate. 
There is also the debate about how the core principles reject the idea that NGOs 
should play any other role then one where it is a provider of assistance to all 
parties of a conflict.  The base for all humanitarian assistance should, by the 
traditional viewpoint, be based after the level of need. If NGOs take a step 
towards cooperating with the military, other consideration then need and 
humanity might influence how and where humanitarian assistance is delivered. 
 So even though the Norwegian government is using the model within an 
international setting the larger Norwegian NGOs are strong and are viewed as 
„development partners‟. Giving them more room to develop their own role and 
many of them have ties to the grassroots‟ that hinders them in being co-opt into a 
paradigm that is built on other political agendas. The situation may however be 
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different for smaller NGOs that are more dependent on state founding (Braem 
2008).  
One of the theories used in this thesis is the integration theory. It assumes that 
over a period of time Norwegian NGOs have been integrated into the Norwegian 
political sphere through normative integration and economical integration. The 
argument that some organisations align themselves to the Norwegian model due 
to financial support, functions to a certain extent, at least for the smaller NGOs.  
While larger NGOs are more likely to integrated trough normative integration. 
Normative integration theory suggested that the government used state standards 
as base for their view of NGOs and their capabilities. Larger organisations that 
can match the state standards and still stay flexible seem to be one of the criteria.  
What then about the crossing views on impact of more cooperation? The focus on 
consensus is one of the main pillars in the Norwegian model. How is that notion 
functioning? As shown it is clearly a difference between the various actors view 
on how humanitarian assistance will be affected by a tripartite approach to aid. 
The shortage of a common platform is suggested as one reason for the lack of 
consensus. The epistemology theory suggested that the view and understanding of 
how civil-military cooperation will affect humanitarian aid and the model shifts 
between the various actors due to their experiences. This is also supported by the 
discussion about the terminology used by the different actors. 
One issue all parties seemed to agree on was the need for clear defined roles and 
clear division of labour, but again there are some differences of opinion on where 
these lines should go. While the Norwegian government view the importance of 
clear defined roles and labour as a means to better cooperation. On one hand clear 
defined roles was viewed as a way to preserve the humanitarian space and the 
integrity of NGOs, but as the context around the NGOs changes the view on what 
is „humanitarian‟ seems to change. The discussion around how „quick impact‟ 
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operations, that often are lead by military actors, seems to lead towards activities 
of a developmental art. NGOs argued that t blurred the lines of what role the 
military and the NGOs should have. The military on the other hand did not see it 
this way, arguing that what they were doing was not humanitarian, but 
development work a part of their mission statement. 
The role of PRTs in Afghanistan was another topic in this thesis. This hybrid 
made to fill in the gaps between the military and humanitarian actor was also 
given most of the blame for the „blurring of roles‟. Their mandate to assist and 
facilitate development was interpreted in different ways, making the distance 
between NGOs and the military grow smaller in theory, but increase in practice.  
Another topic has been the discussion of humanitarian principles and the 
criticism towards the principle of neutrality. The debate within the humanitarian 
body suggested that it is time to make a break from the traditional form of 
humanitarian assistance. The traditional form, due to its narrow focus on the core 
principles, is by some NGOs viewed as outdated. They argue that it hinders 
NGOs to actively engage themselves in political matters. The traditional based 
humanitarians disagrees stressing that it is only trough neutrality NGOs can  
guarantee for apolitical assistance and gain full access to people that need 
assistance. The new humanitarian approach stress that more cooperation is 
needed to face today‟s conflicts.  The merging of relief, development and security 
is what is having most impact on humanitarian aid. Used in correlation to the 
question raised in this thesis it is evident that the role Norway play in Afghanistan 
is affecting the Norwegian model and Norway‟s humanitarian aid. The use of 
Norwegian NGOs as development partners in foreign actions and as partner in a 
comprehensive approach in Afghanistan may lead to the perception that 
Norwegian aid is not as neutral as one would like it to be.  
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8.2 Is Consensus lost in Co-operation? 
The current debate on civil-military cooperation and the possible outcome it has 
for the humanitarian space is as shown a broad discussion. The use of Norwegian 
NGOs as development partners becomes difficult if these NGOs also will be 
incorporated into the „whole of government‟ approach that the government wants 
to develop in Afghanistan. The impact civil-military cooperation will have on the 
unique relationship will depend on how the approach recognizes the different 
roles each actor has and how especially the NGOs respond to the changing 
contexts. Hirschman‟s theory provides three options, and as shown there is 
several ways NGOs can maintain their integrity, while working closely to the 
Norwegian government and military. The only factor that may be a hinder is if 
funding becomes problematic if they choose to exit or voice against government 
policies. 
Another factor to consider when discussing civil-military cooperation is that this 
is a fairly new approach and a lot of the premonitions on how this is going to alter 
humanitarian aid are built on assumptions. The situation in Afghanistan is also a 
unique situation, where many actors are involved and a lot of them are following 
their own agenda. 
So is consensus lost in cooperation? The civil-military cooperation model is 
about coherence and to achieve a coherent approach there needs to be consensus. 
The research done in this thesis shows that there seems to be little of both when it 
comes to the civil-military cooperation debate. It is clear that the humanitarian 
actors only want military actors‟ assistance when they ask for it and even then in 
a soft manner.  All parties agree on the need for clearly defined roles and see that 
this is vital for each and any one of them for them to coexist in the same conflict. 
The problem with today‟s conflict are that the insecurity level goes back and 
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forth all the time, one area that is safe today, may be unsafe tomorrow making  it 
difficult  to develop approaches where all three actors can function together . 
 And how will that affect humanitarian assistance? It may seem that with this 
political shift the principle behind where and when aid is delivered will affect 
humanitarian assistance. The consensus aspects will also be affected, but as the 
humanitarian debate showed there are also changes within the humanitarian body 
that may foster a new platform for cooperation and therefore one can assume that 
a new platform for consensus may develop. 
8.3  The end? 
Is civil-military cooperation the new way to go when approaching the complex 
conflicts of today? And how does it affect the relationship between Norwegian 
NGOs and the Norwegian government? Today, the diminishing  humanitarian 
space and the insecure environment many NGOs face is due to the civilization of 
armed forces, either by being driven to, or wanting to, engage themselves in more 
civilian operations.  The merging of security, development and relief will most 
likely continue  as a result of today‟s complex conflicts and if one wants to try to 
mold this development, some level of cooperation may be needed to develop a 
better understanding for the roles each actor has. 
 Before engaging in a complex conflict situation today, it is evident that there 
needs to be some level of coordination and cooperation between the different 
actors involved. So the question is how much cooperation is enough? Some 
NGOs mean that any coordination over information sharing is pushing it, while 
others are comfortable with having military convoys around them in the field. For 
Norwegian NGOs the idea of civil- military cooperation is a fairly new concept, 
even though Norwegian NGOs have for many years worked closely with the 
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Norwegian government. The hesitation of openly working with a third armed 
actor is due to the security risk this will lead to on the ground. NGOs are 
dependent on presenting themselves as independent to establish trust. Working 
with armed forces is assumed to have a negative impact.  
Norway is not functioning in a vacuum, but in a globalised world events on the 
other side of the world can affect us here. The focus on failed states as a security 
dilemma has driven military forces to expand their role beyond their traditional 
position. The structural drivers behind this are the linkages between security and 
the unstable environment and it is leading to an expansion of different 
peacekeeping missions. 
The current political shift towards a more explicit use of NGOs and military 
actors to create more sustainable approaches seem to stir up different underlining 
perceptions of how NGOs see their work being used.  NGOs have the possibility 
to work in areas and with people that under any other circumstances would not 
have received help.  The new trend towards more cooperation and the new 
humanitarianism may lead to NGOs losing this ability due to their political 
standing or because they may become too much embedded into military structures 
and political inters.  
So does this means the end for Norwegian model and the cooperation that has 
been between the NGOs and the state. Will it be replaced with civil-military 
cooperation? Norway‟s involvement in the process within NATO and Norway‟s 
own „whole of approach‟ supports a shift towards more integrated approaches in 
the future. This is also a way to adapt to today‟s conflicts. NGOs as I see it have 
different options and can affect the role they might get in this process. Some form 
of cooperation will always be the standard in Norway due to the level of 
integration Norwegian NGOs have gone trough.  It is important to remember that 
it is their role as independent, impartial and neutral actors that give them access 
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to areas where other actors might not be able to reach. If they lose this position it 
will hit the weakest the hardest, those who relay on humanitarian assistance.  
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